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BAGRAM, BOUMEDIENE, AND
LIMITED GOVERNMENT
Marc D. Falkoff*
Robert Knowles**
INTRODUCTION
The United States' prison at Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan will be
the next front in the battle over the extraterritorial reach of the Con-
stitution. Habeas litigation on behalf of Bagram detainees will soon
establish whether the writ of habeas corpus extends beyond U.S. terri-
tory to active war zones, and it will also begin to refine the limits of
presidential power in the war on terror. In this Article, we argue that,
as the courts begin to wrestle with these issues, their foremost task
should be to determine whether the Constitution authorizes the U.S.
government to suspend the protections of the writ, rather than to dis-
cover whether detainees abroad possess a "right" to judicial review of
the legality of their detentions. More broadly, we suggest that the
U.S. Supreme Court's new multifactor balancing test for determining
the extraterritorial reach of the writ (announced in June 2008 in
Boumediene v. Bush') must be understood as embodying a limited
government approach, rather than a rights-based approach, to defin-
ing the global reach of the Constitution.
For more than eight years, the legal struggle over the legitimacy of
U.S. post-9/11 detention policy has been narrowly focused on our off-
shore prison at Guantanamo Bay. In the public consciousness, Guan-
tanamo has become the touchstone for debates about the limits of
presidential power and about our commitment as a country to the rule
of law. In the courts, these same issues have played themselves out in
dozens of cases, including three before the Supreme Court, in which
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1. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
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the authority of the Judicial Branch to supervise the detentions at
Guantanamo has been challenged. 2
Numbers alone do not account for the prominence of Guantanamo
in the public mind. Although 779 prisoners have spent time there
since January 2002, fewer than 200 prisoners remain.3 While these are
significant figures, at present our country holds thousands of prisoners
in noncriminal, extrajudicial detention in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other
countries around the world.4
Part of the reason for the emergence of Guantanamo as ground
zero in the fight over detention policy is its proximity to the territorial
United States. The prison is, relatively speaking, easily accessible to
lawyers who are willing to represent men who are accused of engaging
in terrorist activity or associating with terrorist groups. Also, because
Guantanamo has been under the complete jurisdiction and control of
the United States for decades, lawyers for the detainees recognized
that challenges to U.S. detention policy might have a greater chance
of success for Guantanamo prisoners than for prisoners in war zones
and other far-off locales.
The strategy of focusing initial legal challenges on Guantanamo has
borne fruit. In June 2008, the Supreme Court announced in
Boumediene v. Bush that the Constitution's guarantee of access to the
writ of habeas corpus extends to the prisoners at Guantanamo. 5
Boumediene was the first decision to hold that the writ could reach
noncitizens who are held beyond the territorial United States,6 and it
2. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006);
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). The Court had granted certiorari in another Guantanamo
matter to decide whether a district court judge has the power to order the government to release
successful habeas petitioners into the United States; however, the Court vacated its earlier deci-
sion when other countries made resettlement offers to the detainees. See Kiyemba v. Obama,
130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010).
3. See BENJAMIN WITrES & ZAAHIRA WYNE, BROOKINGS INST., THE CURRENT DETAINEE
POPULATION OF GUANTANAMO: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 1 (2008), available at http://www.brook-
ings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/reports/2008/1216 detainees-wittes/1216-detainees-wittes.pdf (noting
that 779 detainees have passed through the facility since January 2002); Andy Worthington,
GuantAnamo: The Definitive Prisoner List (Updated for 2010) (Jan. 4, 2010), http://www.
andyworthington.co.uk/2010/01/04/guantanamo-the-definitive-prisoner-list-updated-for-2010/
(noting that as of December 31, 2009, six prisoners have died at Guantanamo, one has been
transferred to the United States to face criminal charges, 574 have been released, and 198
remain).
4. See, e.g., Lindsay Wise, Mission for Some: Watch over Detainees, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 10,
2010, at Al (noting that the "number of detainees in U.S. custody in Iraq peaked at about 26,000
in 2007," and that as of January 2010 about 6,000 remained).
5. 128 S. Ct. at 2262.
6. Id. The Court had earlier held that statutory habeas extended to Guantanamo in Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004), but Congress stripped statutory jurisdiction in 2005 and 2006.
See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739-44 (2005)
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seems reasonable to question whether this would have been the result
if it were not the case that "[i]n every practical sense Guantanamo is
not abroad."'7
Thus, although it took seven years and three Supreme Court deci-
sions to establish that the Constitution ensures that the Guantanamo
petitioners may have their day in court, and although to this day the
overwhelming majority of the prisoners have still not had a merits
hearing on their habeas petitions,8 Guantanamo in many ways repre-
sents the easy case in challenges to long-term executive detention. In-
formation about prisons in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, is
much harder to come by, and journalists are less likely to press for
access to detention centers that are thousands of miles from home.
Likewise, volunteer lawyers cannot feasibly visit and represent clients
who are detained in distant war zones. As a purely legal matter, too,
challenges to extrajudicial detention grow more difficult as the prison-
ers' connections to the United States grow increasingly remote.
Predictably, therefore, there has been little litigation over whether
the protections of the writ reach beyond Guantanamo to other "war
on terror" prisons. But the next major phase of the challenge to the
President's detention authority has already begun. A handful of pris-
oners at the Bagram Theater Internment Facility (BTIF) near Kabul,
Afghanistan, have filed habeas petitions in U.S. federal court, seeking
court review of the legality of their detentions. These petitioners-
each of whom has been detained for at least six years without charge,
trial, or access to a lawyer-are among more than 600 prisoners being
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. (2006)) (pur-
porting to strip habeas jurisdiction for Guantanamo detainees and replace it with exclusive, but
limited, review of CSRT proceedings in the D.C. Circuit); Military Commissions Act of 2006
(MCA), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635-36 (2006)(codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950w
and scattered sections of 10 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. (2006)) (eliminating
habeas corpus for all aliens who are designated as "enemy combatants" or are awaiting a deter-
mination of that status).
7. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2261; see Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480.
8. More than one year after the Boumediene decision was issued, most petitioners have not
had merits hearings, notwithstanding Justice Kennedy's admonition that "the costs of delay can
no longer be borne by those who are held in custody." Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2275. Of the
forty-four cases that have been resolved on the merits through February 2010, petitioners have
been victorious thirty-three times. Chisun Lee, An Examination of 41 Gitmo Detainee Lawsuits,
PROPUBLICA (updated Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.propublica.org/speciallan-examination-of-31-
gitmo-detainee-lawsuits-722 (last visited Mar. 12, 2010); Carol Rosenberg & Mark Seibel, Judge
Orders Another Guantanamo Detainee Freed, MCCLATCHY-TRIB. NEWS SERV., Feb. 25, 2010,
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/220102/25/88413/judge-orders-another-guantanamo.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 12, 2010) (reporting one more habeas merits decision).
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held at the U.S. airbase at Bagram. 9 Very little is known about this
mass of prisoners or about the reasons for their continued detention. 10
The federal courts' conclusions about whether habeas extends to
U.S. prisoners at Bagram will be crucial to establishing the limits on
executive power during wartime. These limits cannot be discerned by
the courts without a clear understanding of how the Constitution ap-
plies abroad. In this Article we examine these questions, assessing
whether the Suspension Clause should have extraterritorial effect at
the BTIF.1' Our analysis proceeds in light of our reading of Justice
Kennedy's opinion in Boumediene as embodying a limited govern-
ment theory of the Constitution. This approach focuses on whether
the government has exceeded its constitutional mandate, rather than
on the rights that the Constitution may afford to an individual.
In Part II of the Article, we provide a brief history of U.S. detention
operations at Bagram and describe the procedures used to determine
whether the Bagram prisoners are "unlawful enemy combatants. ' 12
In this Part, we also recount the Guantanamo habeas litigation and
Congress's response, 13 setting the stage for our discussion of Justice
Kennedy's opinion in Boumediene and its multifactor test for deter-
mining whether habeas extends extraterritorially. In Part III, we as-
sess Justice Kennedy's self-described "pragmatic" approach to
constitutional theory in Boumediene and explain why it is best under-
stood as relying on a limited government theory.14 In Part IV, we
assess whether the writ should extend to prisoners at Bagram, apply-
ing the multifactor Boumediene test through the prism of the limited
government approach.1 5 We conclude that the writ should extend to
detainees at Bagram, just as it extends to detainees at Guantanamo.
Finally, we review the one federal court opinion, Maqaleh v. Gates,
9. The prisoners' names were made public for the first time in January 2010, in response to a
Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed by the American Civil Liberties Union. See Press
Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Obtains List of Bagram Detainees (Jan. 15, 2010),
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-obtains-list-bagram-detainees (last visited Mar. 4,
2010). The list, which includes the names of 645 men detained at Bagram as of September 2009,
is available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assetsfbagramdetainees.pdf.
10. As Amy Davidson pithily observes, "If Guantanamo is, to quote the poetry of Donald
Rumsfeld, a known known, Bagram is a known unknown." Posting to Close Read, What's Go-
ing On at Bagram?, http://www.newyorker.comlonlineblogs/closeread/2009/09/close-read-whats-
going-on-at-bagram.html (Sept. 14, 2009).
11. The Suspension Clause of the Constitution provides, "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
12. See infra notes 17-57 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 58-75 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 76-185 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 186-207 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 59:851
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addressing the application of habeas to Bagram.a6 We contend that
the district court's conclusion-that the writ extends to non-Afghans
being detained at Bagram but not to Afghans-is anomalous and can
best be explained by the court's failure to recognize the limited gov-
ernment underpinnings of Boumediene.
II. BAGRAM, U.S. DETENTION POLICY, AND THE
REACH OF THE WRIT
Guantanamo was an informational black hole until volunteer
habeas lawyers were given access to their clients in fall 2004.17 Even
as late as spring 2006, a full roster of the prisoners who had been held
at the prison had not yet been released. 18 But the proximity of the
prison to the mainland United States assured, at least, that journalists
would maintain pressure on the government to make the prison more
transparent. For the Bagram prison, however, the current state of our
ignorance is remarkable. In this Part, we review what we know of the
history and present status of the BTIF, describe (as best we can learn)
the procedures that have been used to determine the Bagram prison-
ers' "unlawful enemy combatant" status, and provide an overview of
the litigation and legislative fights since 9/11 that have set the legal
framework for assessing whether these prisoners can challenge the le-
gality of their detention in U.S. courts.
16. See infra notes 208-225 and accompanying text.
17. See Al Odah v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14-15 (D.D.C. 2004) (holding that Guan-
tanamo petitioners are entitled to counsel and that the government may not engage in "real time
monitoring" of attorney-client conversations).
18. In January 2005, Lieutenant Commander Matthew M. Diaz, a staff judge advocate in the
Navy who was stationed at Guantanamo, sent a classified list of the 551 men who were being
detained at the prison to a lawyer at the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR). See Tim
Golden, Naming Names at Gitmo, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 21, 2007, at 78, 80. The CCR lawyer
contacted a federal judge rather than make the information public, and the judge ordered the list
to be turned over to the Department of Justice. Id. at 80. The list of detainees remained secret,
but Diaz was court-martialed and convicted of disclosing secret defense information, after which
he served a six-month prison sentence. Id. at 83. The Department of Defense first released the
names of the 558 detainees who had gone through the Combatant Status Review Tribunal
(CSRT) process at Guantanamo on April 19, 2006. See Kathleen T. Rhem, DoD Releases Names
of 759 Current, Former Guantanamo Detainees, AM. FORCES PRESS SERv., May 15, 2006, http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=15754. Defense officials released the complete
list of names (including the other 201 detainees who had been transferred or released before
going through the CSRT process) about one month later. See List of Individuals Detained by
the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from January 2002 Through May 15,
2006 (May 15, 2006), http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2006/d20060515%2OList.pdf.
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A. History of the Bagram Theater Internment Facility
Bagram is something of an accidental prison. Though more than six
hundred prisoners are now being held in detention there, Bagram
Airbase was never designed to be a long-term detention center. Built
by the Soviets during their occupation of Afghanistan, the airbase
served during the 1980s as a base of operations for Soviet troops, but
it fell into disrepair after the ouster of the Soviets from Afghanistan in
the 1990s. 19 Upon the invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001, the U.S.
military took over the site, which Pentagon officials described at the
time as little more than a "cavernous former machine shop."20
Within weeks of taking control of Bagram Airbase, the military
converted some of its airplane hangars into structures for the tempo-
rary housing of detainees.2 1 The site was named the "Bagram Collec-
tion Point"-later to be renamed the "Bagram Theater Internment
Facility"-and was expected to function as a temporary "collection
center" for the intake-screening of prisoners who would be detained
long-term elsewhere. In May 2002, the BTIF was designated as the
"primary collection and interrogation point" for detainees captured in
the Afghan war theater.22 Because prisoners who were slated for
long-term detention were typically sent to Guantanamo23-where
Bush Administration lawyers had posited that the federal courts
would have no jurisdiction over noncitizen detainees 4-the Bagram
facility's detainee population remained consistently low throughout
2002. By mid-2004, when it became increasingly likely that the Guan-
tanamo prisoners would be allowed access to the federal courts, trans-
fers of prisoners to Guantanamo rapidly declined, and the prisoner
population at Kandahar and Bagram began to rise.25
19. See Michael R. Gordon, Securing Base, U.S. Makes Its Brawn Blend In, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
3, 2001, at B1.
20. See Tim Golden & Eric Schmitt, A Growing Afghan Prison Rivals Bleak Guantanamo,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2006, at Al.
21. Vice Admiral A.T. Church, Office of the Sec'y of Def., Review of Department of Defense
Detention Operations and Detainee Interrogation Techniques 181-82 (2005) [hereinafter
Church Report].
22. Amnesty Int'l, USA: Out of Sight, Out of Mind, Out of Court? The Right of Bagram
Detainees to Judicial Review 6 (2009) [hereinafter Amnesty Report].
23. See CHURCH REPORT, supra note 21, at 182-83.
24. See, e.g., Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin & John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attor-
neys General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over Aliens Held in Guanta-
namo Bay, Cuba 1 (Dec. 28, 2001), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/83/
20011228-philbin-yoo-guantanamo-habeus-memo.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2010).
25. See CHURCH REPORT, supra note 21, at 185-86 (noting the increase in prisoner population
in military bases in Afghanistan in mid-2004); Tim Golden, Defying U.S. Plan, Prison Expands in
Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2008, at Al (noting that transfers to Guantanamo had "largely
shut off" by September 2004).
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Until January 2010, the military had refused to publicly release the
identities of the prisoners being held at Bagram. Indeed, there are
few solid numbers even detailing the population fluctuations at the
BTIF.26 As best we can tell, the prison population grew from about
300 prisoners in early 2004 to about 600 prisoners in July 2008, with a
present population (as of September 2009) of approximately 645 pris-
oners.27 There is little reason to expect that this population will shrink
in the near future, particularly because work proceeds apace on the
construction of a $60 million, forty-acre prison at the BTIEF, which is
designed to replace the current structures and house up to 1,100
prisoners. 28
As these numbers suggest, the BTIF is no longer just a screening
and processing point for detainees, but instead has become a primary
long-term detention center in the war on terror. The terms of U.S.
agreements with the Afghan government to control the area reflect
this long-term commitment. Since 2006, the U.S. military's possession
of Bagram Airfield has been formalized by a lease in which Afghani-
stan consigns all facilities and land located there "for use by the
United States and Coalition Forces for military purposes. ' 29 Like the
contract between Cuba and the United States for the use of Guanta-
namo, the Bagram lease by its terms will remain in effect so long as
the United States wishes.30 Also like the Guantanamo lease, which
26. In April 2009, the American Civil Liberties Union made a Freedom of Information Act
request seeking the names, citizenship, capture date, days detained, capture location, and cir-
cumstances of capture of the Bagram prisoners. In July, the Department of Defense acknowl-
edged that the National Detainee Reporting Center was in possession of this information, but
refused to release it on national security grounds. See Letter from Paul J. Jacobsmeyer, Chief,
Office of Freedom of Info., U.S. Dep't of Def., to Melissa Goodman, Am. Civil Liberties Union
Found. (July 28, 2009), https://www.aclu.org/pdfs/natsec/bagramfoia-dodappealletter.pdf (last
visited Jan. 23, 2010).
27. See Press Release, supra note 9. As of August 2004, U.S. forces had detained just over
2,000 people since operations began. CHURCH REPORT, supra note 21, at 233. These numbers
do not reflect the prisoner population at Pul-i-Charki, an Afghan prison complex that now
houses an American-financed high-security wing, called the Afghan National Defense Facility.
See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: TRIALS OF BAGRAM AND GUANTANAMO
DETAINEES IN AFGHANISTAN ii (2008), http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/USLS-080409-
arbitrary-justice-report.pdf. (last visited Mar. 21, 2010).
28. Eric Schmitt & Tim Golden, U.S. Set to Build Big New Prison in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES,
May 17, 2008, at Al.
29. Accommodation Consignment Agreement for Lands and Facilities at Bagram Airfield Be-
tween the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America (Sept. 26, 2006)
(emphasis omitted) [hereinafter Bagram Lease], available at http://washingtonindependent.com/
wp-content/uploads/2009/01/miller-declarationl.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2010) (attached as Ex-
hibit 1 to Declaration of Colonel Rose M. Miller, Ruzatullah v. Rumsfeld, No. 06-CV-01707
(D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2006)).
30. Compare Treaty Between the United States of America and Cuba, U.S.-Cuba, art. III,
May 29, 1934, T.S. No. 866, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th-century/dip-cuba001.asp
857
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provides that "the United States shall exercise complete jurisdiction
and control over and within said areas,"'31 the United States maintains
complete control over the Bagram Airfield and "shall have exclusive,
peaceable, undisturbed and uninterrupted possession of [Bagram Air-
field] during the existence of this agreement .... without any inter-
ruption whatsoever by [Afghanistan] or its agents."' 32 In addition,
pursuant to a diplomatic agreement, Afghanistan has ceded elements
of its sovereignty, including the right to exercise criminal jurisdiction
over U.S. personnel and its detainees.33
B. The Enemy Combatant Status of the Bagram Prisoners
The Bagram prisoners are all being detained as "unlawful enemy
combatants." The procedures used to determine the prisoners' status,
however, have been demonstrably inadequate to the task. Indeed, by
their terms, they are even less protective than the "closed and accusa-
torial" procedures that were used for the Guantanamo prisoners and
that the Supreme Court disapproved of in Boumediene.34 The result is
that there may well be hundreds of men wrongfully detained at
(last visited Mar. 21, 2010) (the treaty will continue "[slo long as the United States of America
shall not abandon the said naval station of Guantanamo or the two Governments shall not agree
to a modification of its present limits"), with Bagram Lease, supra note 29, 4 ("The term of this
Agreement... shall continue until the [United States] or its successors determine that the Prem-
ises are no longer required for its use.").
31. Under the terms of the 1903 lease with Cuba, "the United States recognizes the continu-
ance of the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba" over Guantanamo, while Cuba "con-
sents that during the period of the occupation by the United States ... the United States shall
exercise complete jurisdiction and control over and within said areas." Lease of Lands for Coal-
ing and Naval Stations, Feb. 23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, art. III, Feb. 23, 1903, T.S. No. 418 [hereinafter
Guantanamo Lease]. For an exhaustive history of the Guantanamo leases and treaties, see
MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, THE LEASING OF GUANTANAMO BAY (2009).
32. Bagram Lease, supra note 29, 9.
33. Diplomatic Note No. 202, Embassy of the United States of America, Kabul 3 (Sept. 26,
2002), appended to Respondents' Motion to Dismiss First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus, Exhibit 2, Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 06-CV-1669 (JDB) (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2008). The ex-
change of this note with diplomatic notes from the Afghanistan government, Note No. 791, Tran-
sitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fifth Political Department
(Dec. 12, 2002), and Note No. 93, Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, American and Canada Political Affairs Department (May 28, 2003), constitutes a formal
agreement that remains in force. STEVE BOWMAN & CATHERINE DALE, CONG. RES. SERV.,
WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: STRATEGY, MILITARY OPERATIONS, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 22
(Feb. 25, 2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40156.pdf.
34. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. at 2229, 2270 (2008).
[E]ven when all the parties involved in this process act with diligence and in good faith,
there is considerable risk of error in the tribunal's findings of fact. This is a risk inher-
ent in any process that, in the words of the former Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals,
is "closed and accusatorial." And given that the consequence of error may be deten-
tion of persons for the duration of hostilities that may last a generation or more, this is
a risk too significant to ignore.
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Bagram, entirely innocent of any affiliation with the Taliban or al
Qaeda.
This suggestion is not fanciful. The records that are publicly availa-
ble suggest that most of the detainees who have been taken into cus-
tody during the Afghanistan conflict were not, as the Bush
Administration would have had us believe, captured on a battlefield
by U.S. troops.35 A March 2005 review of detainee operations, au-
thored by Vice Admiral Albert T. Church, found that prisoners
"[came] into U.S. custody in Afghanistan through several means" and
that only a "small number ... were captured during traditional force-
on-force fighting against Taliban or al Qaeda groups, or following the
seizure of an enemy facility. ' 36 Most prisoners were instead "cap-
tured by opposition groups, such as the Northern Alliance, and trans-
ferred to U.S. control. '37 Likewise, Brigadier General Charles H.
Jacoby, Jr. reported in 2004 that the basis for U.S. detentions in Af-
ghanistan was "often poorly documented" and that in some locations
"cordon and search operations yield[ed] large numbers of detainees
without apparent application of specific criteria. '38 Because none of
these prisoners were captured wearing a uniform, identifying their sta-
tus as soldiers or civilians is crucial to assuring that the U.S. govern-
ment is not indefinitely detaining an innocent person.
As one of us has discussed elsewhere, 39 the U.S. military has utterly
failed in Afghanistan to engage in the type of screening required by
the Geneva Conventions and U.S. Army regulations, and the results
have been disastrous. There are two reasons that a person who is
caught near a battlefield might be wearing civilian clothes. One is that
the person is an enemy soldier disguised as a civilian; such behavior is,
Id. at 2270 (citations omitted) (quoting Bismullah v. Gates, 514 F.3d 1291, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(Ginsburg, C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc)).
35. Vice President Dick Cheney, for example, stated in an interview with CNN, "The people
that are there are people we picked up on the battlefield, primarily in Afghanistan. They're
terrorists. They're bomb makers. They're facilitators of terror. They're members of Al Qaeda
and the Taliban." CNN, Cheney on Osama and Gitmo, http://edition.cnn.com/2005/US/06/24/
cheney/index.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2010) (transcript of interview by Wolf Blitzer with then-
Vice President Dick Cheney).
36. CHURCH REPORT, supra note 21, at 189.
37. Id.
38. BRIGADIER GENERAL CHARLES H. JACOBY, JR., CFC-A AO DETAINEE OPERATIONs RE-
PORT OF INSPECTION 11 13 (June 26, 2004) [hereinafter JACOBY REPORT]. Among the report's
"general observations" were that "there is no consistent program designed to ensure the integ-
rity of capture data or evidence," that the "basis for detention is often poorly documented," and
that collection procedures "are confusing and inadequate." Id. 1 13, 18.c.
39. See Marc D. Falkoff, Back to Basics: Habeas Corpus Procedures and Long-Term Executive
Detention, 86 DENY. U. L. REv. 961, 989-90 (2009).
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of course, unlawful and a violation of the laws of war.40 The other
reason someone might be wearing civilian dress is that the person is in
fact a civilian. How does one tell the difference? The answer is found
in Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention and in section 190-8 of
the U.S. Army Regulations, both of which require that a status hear-
ing be held, near in time to the capture, in order to determine the
status of the person apprehended. 41 During the Persian Gulf War, the
United States held 1,196 of these Article 5 hearings, which determined
that the United States had captured innocent civilians in 886 instances,
an error rate of seventy-four percent. 42 During the Afghan conflict,
not a single Article 5 hearing was held.43
Given that these status hearings were never held in the Afghan con-
flict-and that the captures were not even made, for the most part, by
U.S. troops44-at the minimum, adequate procedures to ensure a fair
hearing are necessary to determine the legitimacy of individual deten-
40. See, for example, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 48, June
8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, which states,
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian
objects, the Parties to the conflict are required at all times to distinguish between the
civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives
and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.
See also Toni Pfanner, Military Uniforms and the Law of War, 86 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 93,
118-21 (2004) (discussing other international law provisions regarding uniforms and other em-
blems distinguishing combatants and civilians).
41. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 5, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. See also Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel,
Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, U.S. Army Reg. 190-8, I 1-6(a) to (b) (Oct. 1, 1997),
available at http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/rl90-8.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2010), which
requires a
competent tribunal [to] determine the status of any person not appearing to be entitled
to prisoner of war status who has committed a belligerent act or has engaged in hostile
activities in aid of enemy armed forces, and who asserts that he or she is entitled to
treatment as a prisoner of war, or concerning whom any doubt of a like nature exists.
42. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: FINAL REPORT TO CON-
GRESS 578 (1992), available at http://www.ndu.edu/library/epubs/cpgw.pdf (last visited Mar. 22,
2010).
43. CHURCH REPORT, supra note 21, at 187-88 (noting the Geneva Conventions and Army
Regulation requirements, but explaining that no such hearings were held because the Bush Ad-
ministration had made a blanket decision that "the Geneva Conventions did not apply to the
conflict with al Qaeda" and that "although the Geneva Conventions did apply to the conflict
with the Taliban, the Taliban were unlawful combatants and ... not entitled to [enemy prisoner
of war] status").
44. See MARK DENBEAUX & JOSHUA W. DENBEAUX, REPORT ON GUANTANAMO DETAINEES:
A PROFILE OF 517 DETAINEES THROUGH ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DATA 2
(Feb. 8, 2006), available at http://law.shu.edu/news/guantanamo-report-final-2_-08 06.pdf (last
visited Mar. 22, 2010) (reviewing military documents and finding that 86% of Guantanamo de-
tainees were initially captured by Northern Alliance or Pakistani security forces, not by U.S.
troops).
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tions at the BTIF. One might reasonably suspect that scores, if not
hundreds, of the prisoners at the BTIF are indeed wrongly detained.
At Guantanamo there have been forty-four habeas corpus hearings to
date that have been decided on the merits in federal court since the
Boumediene decision came down, and judges have determined that
the petitioners were innocent and illegally detained in thirty-three of
those cases. 45 Even leaving aside the fact that one might expect the
cases against these petitioners to be stronger than the cases against the
hundreds of prisoners who had previously been released from Guan-
tanamo, the habeas merits decisions suggest a 79% error rate with
respect to the "enemy combatant" status of these prisoners. That fig-
ure is remarkably similar to the 74% error rate that the United States
discovered in the immediate aftermath of prisoner captures during the
Persian Gulf War.
Clearly, the status hearings provided by the military at Guanta-
namo, called Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), were not
adequate to the task of separating combatants from civilians. A
glance at the procedures shows why this was inevitably the case. The
detainee was allowed to appear in person at the tribunal and, in the-
ory, to call "available" witnesses. 46 He was, however, presumed
guilty47 and was not permitted the assistance of a lawyer.48 He was
45. See Lee, supra note 8; Rosenberg & Seibel, supra note 8.
46. Another analysis of military documents reveals that in 96% of the CSRTs at Guantanamo
no witnesses were allowed to testify for the detainee. Mark Denbeaux & Joshua W. Denbeaux,
No-Hearing Hearings CSRT: The Modern Habeas Corpus? 25-26 (Seton Hall Pub. Law Re-
search Paper No. 951245, Dec. 2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=951245 (last visited Mar. 22, 2010).
47. CSRT regulations informed officers that the prisoner had already "been determined to be
an enemy combatant through multiple levels of review by officers of the Department of De-
fense." Memorandum to the Sec'y of the Navy, from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec'y of Def.,
Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal 1 (July 7, 2004), http://www.defenselink.
mil/news/Jul2004/d2OO4O7O7review.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2010); see also U.S. Dept. of De-
fense, Defense Department Background Briefing on Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7,
2004), http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2751 (last visited Mar. 22,
2010). New rules, differing in no material respect in relation to the issues discussed in the ac-
companying text, were promulgated following Congress's passage of the Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006 & Supp. I 2008).
48. The prisoner was instead entitled only to a "personal representative" from the military-a
person who by regulation could not be a lawyer, with whom the prisoner would not share a
confidential relationship, and who was required to report any inculpatory statements from the
prisoner to the tribunal. See Memorandum from Gordon England, Sec'y of the Navy, Imple-
mentation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained
at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, enclosure (1) 1 C(3) (July 14, 2004), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2006/d2006O8O9CSRTProcedures.pdf (requiring that the
personal representative "shall not be a judge advocate"); id. enclosure (3) C(1) (ordering that
the personal representative "shall explain to the detainee that no confidential relationship exists
or may be formed between" them); id. enclosure (3) § D (directing the personal representative
to tell prisoners, "None of the information you provide me shall be held in confidence and I may
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allowed to see only "reasonably available" evidence, which did not
include any of the classified evidence against him. Having never seen
the witness's statements, the detainee could not seek to controvert
them on the grounds that they were untrustworthy hearsay, or even
that they were derived from abuse or torture. In Boumediene, the
Supreme Court rejected the Bush Administration's argument that
these procedures afforded prisoners at Guantanamo adequate process
to assure that they were being properly detained.49
The procedures in place to determine the status of the Bagram pris-
oners were even less adequate than the procedures applied at Guanta-
namo. In fact, no status hearings were held at all until an undisclosed
date in 2007, when the Bagram detainees were first called before an
Enemy Combatant Review Board (ECRB), now known as the Unlaw-
ful Enemy Combatant Review Board (UECRB). 5° The government
has kept the implementing guidance for the UECRBs classified, but
we know that they resemble the Guantanamo CSRTs in that three
military officers determine the detainee's status, relying at least in part
on classified information that might not have been made available to
the detainee.5 1 The detainee is informed only of the "general basis of
his detention" 52 and, until recently, has been entitled to make only a
written statement in response to allegations that he is an unlawful en-
emy combatant. In April 2008, Bagram prisoners were allowed for
the first time to appear before the board in person. 53 No lawyers are
allowed to participate in the hearing, and witnesses may be called only
if they are "reasonably available, ... provided that such interviews
would not affect combat, intelligence gathering, law enforcement, or
support operations. ' '54
In the wake of a district court holding that these procedures do not
adequately afford the Bagram detainees an opportunity to rebut the
be obligated to divulge it at the hearing."). For an example of the dysfunctional relationship of a
"personal representative" and a prisoner, see Marc Falkoff, This Is to Whom It May Concern: A
Guantanamo Narrative, 1 DEPAUL J. Soc. JUST. 153, 160-62 (2008), reprinted in THE UNITED
STATES AND TORTURE: INTERROGATION, INCARCERATION AND ABUSE (Marjorie Cohn ed.,
forthcoming 2010).
49. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2260 (2008) (noting that the review of CSRT
proceedings by the appellate court in order to assure that these procedures were followed "can-
not cure all defects in the earlier proceedings").
50. See AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 22, at 18.
51. See Respondents' Motion to Dismiss First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
at 9, Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C 2009) (No. 1:06-cv-01669).
52. Id. at 8.
53. See Declaration of Colonel Charles A. Tennison 1 13, Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d
205 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 1:06-cv-01669) [hereinafter Tennison Declaration].
54. Id. 9 12.
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evidence against them, 55 the Obama Administration announced that
"enhanced detainee review procedures" would henceforth be used at
Bagram.56 These new procedures-which include timelier notice of
the basis of internment, an unclassified summary of the specific facts
supporting the internment, an opportunity to appear in person before
the UECRB, and the assistance of a personal representative 57-are of
course an improvement over the minimalist process in place during
the Bush Administration. But they are in fact no more protective
than the procedures that the Court has already found inadequate in
the Guantanamo context.
C. Habeas Corpus at Bagram: The Legislative, Litigation, and
Political Background
We would not now be asking whether habeas corpus extends to
Bagram were it not for the successful litigation effort to establish that
the writ is operative at Guantanamo. That effort began in early 2002,
just months after Guantanamo opened as a "war on terror" detention
center. Habeas petitions were filed in federal court for a handful of
prisoners, including British and Kuwaiti citizens. These petitions were
dismissed by the district court, which concluded that it did not have
statutory jurisdiction over habeas applications filed by noncitizens
who were being detained in non-U.S. territories. 58 The court of ap-
peals affirmed this dismissal.59 In June 2004, however, the Supreme
Court held in Rasul v. Bush that the habeas corpus statute did in fact
provide the courts with jurisdiction to hear the habeas petitions from
Guantanamo prisoners. 60 "Petitioners contend that they are being
held in federal custody in violation of the laws of the United States,"
55. U.S. District Court Judge John D. Bates, reviewing the procedures used by the UECRBs
for the habeas petitioners appearing before him, noted in April 2009 that the
[dietainees cannot even speak for themselves; they are only permitted to submit a writ-
ten statement. But in submitting that statement, detainees do not know what evidence
the United States relies upon to justify an "enemy combatant" designation-so they
lack a meaningful opportunity to rebut that evidence .... And, unlike the CSRT pro-
cess, Bagram detainees receive no review beyond the UECRB itself.
Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 227 (D.D.C. 2009).
56. See Letter from Philip Carter, Deputy Assistant Sec'y of Def. for Detainee Policy, to Sena-
tor Carl Levin 1 (July 14, 2009) (revealing that new UECRB procedures for Bagram were ap-
proved on July 2, 2009), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/
addendum.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2010).
57. Id. add. at 2-4 (Detainee Review Procedures at Bagram Theater Internment Facility
(BTIF), Afghanistan).
58. See Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 56 (D.D.C. 2002).
59. See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2003), affg Rasul v. Bush,
215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002).
60. See generally Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)).
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the Court said, and the habeas statute, "by its terms, requires nothing
more."
6
'
The government's response to Rasul, once the cases were remanded
to the district court and more habeas petitions were filed, was to again
seek dismissal of the suits. The government's argument was that, al-
though the courts had jurisdiction to decide whether a petitioner's de-
tention was "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States," the Guantanamo petitioners possessed no constitu-
tional rights that could be violated, and that therefore, as a matter of
law, the writ could not issue in any of their cases. Two district court
judges issued disparate rulings on this issue, leading to an appeal in
the case that the petitioners lost and an interlocutory appeal in the
case that the prisoners won.62 While this appeal was pending, Con-
gress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA),63 which ap-
peared to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over all Guantanamo
habeas cases.
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, however, the Supreme Court again ad-
dressed the role of the courts at Guantanamo and held that a fair
reading of the DTA-in conjunction with a presumption against stat-
utes with retroactive effect-indicated that Congress had not intended
to strip federal courts of habeas jurisdiction over pending Guanta-
namo petitions.64 In the wake of Hamdan, Congress acted again by
passing the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA),65 which clearly
sought to strip the jurisdiction of the federal courts to hear habeas
petitions from any Guantanamo prisoner, regardless of when the peti-
tion was filed.66 Passage of the MCA set the stage for yet another
return to the Supreme Court.
The question before the Court in Boumediene v. Bush was whether
the Constitution itself required the federal courts to be open to habeas
61. Id. at 483-84.
62. Compare Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 314 (D.D.C. 2005) (granting a government
motion to dismiss habeas petitions), with In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d
443, 445 (D.D.C. 2005) (denying a government motion to dismiss petitions).
63. Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2742 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.
and 42 U.S.C.).
64. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 576-84 (2006).
65.' Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
66. It is indisputable that Congress passed the MCA in response to the Court's decision in
Hamdan. As the Court observed in Boumediene v. Bush, "If this ongoing dialogue between and
among the branches of Government is to be respected, we cannot ignore that the MCA was a
direct response to Hamdan's holding that the DTA's jurisdiction-stripping provision had no ap-
plication to pending cases." Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2243 (2008).
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petitions from the Guantanamo prisoners.67 Writing for the Court,
Justice Kennedy held on constitutional grounds that the writ did ex-
tend to Guantanamo and that the federal courts had jurisdiction to
hear the cases. In his opinion, he emphasized that "practical" consid-
erations-and not "formalism"-were the key to determining
whether the Suspension Clause's protection of habeas applied extra-
territorially. 68 In assessing whether it would be impracticable and
anomalous to respect the writ extraterritorially, Justice Kennedy
noted that the courts were to consider "at least" "the citizenship and
[the] status of the detainee," the "nature of the sites" of capture and
detention, and "the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the [peti-
tioner's] entitlement to the writ."'69 This approach was in line with his
concurring opinion in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, about which
we will have more to say below. 70 In addition, rather than remand to
the lower courts in order to allow them to apply the new multifactor
balancing test, the Court held that the prisoners at Guantanamo could
invoke the writ.71
The Boumediene decision, of course, was essential to the hopes of
Bagram detainees who were likewise petitioning for their day in court.
In contesting the courts' habeas jurisdiction, the Bush Administration
had made the same legal arguments for Bagram that it had long made
for Guantanamo: that, as noncitizens detained outside the sovereign
United States and without any significant voluntary ties to the United
States, the detainees were not entitled to seek the writ. Indeed, in
their arguments against extending the writ to Guantanamo detainees,
the Bush Administration had argued that it would be "arbitrary" to
distinguish between
aliens held at a facility, such as the Bagram Air Force Base in Af-
ghanistan, which is controlled by the U.S. military and located
outside the sovereign territory of the United States, and aliens held
at a facility, such as the Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba, which is
controlled by the U.S. military and located outside the sovereign
territory of the United States .... 72
67. More particularly, the question was whether by passing the MCA Congress had effectively
suspended the writ of habeas corpus in contravention of the Suspension Clause. See U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when
in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.").
68. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2258.
69. Id. at 2259.
70. See infra notes 135-142 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Verdugo-Ur-
quidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990)).
71. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262-63.
72. See Brief for Respondents at 56, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343).
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After losing the Boumediene case, however, the government made
an about-face and sought to distinguish the legal status of Guanta-
namo from Bagram. In the district court, government lawyers argued
that the Supreme Court's decision in Boumediene
was predicated to a significant extent on the unique status of Guan-
tanamo Bay; the United States has exercised what the Court de-
scribed as complete jurisdiction and control over Guantanamo Bay
for over a century. That exercise of jurisdiction and the distance of
Guantanamo Bay from a zone of active hostilities, according to the
Court, warranted the extraterritorial application of the Suspension
Clause there.
The United States enjoys no similarly unbounded and indefinite
control of Bagram Airfield. The U.S. military presence at Bagram
is a transient wartime necessity subject to the host nation's sover-
eignty, and Bagram is, indeed, in an active war zone.73
Few were surprised that the Bush Administration would make such
an argument, but many were shocked that President Obama would
soon adopt the same legal position. In Maqaleh v. Gates, in fact, the
district court judge "invited" government lawyers to "refine their posi-
tion" in the Bagram habeas litigation in light of the new Administra-
tion and President Obama's issuance of an "Executive Order
indicating significant changes to the government's approach to the de-
tention, and review of detention, of individuals held at Guantanamo
Bay."74 The response from the Obama Administration was that it did
not want to modify its position.75
Whether habeas jurisdiction will extend to the BTIF and its detain-
ees will, therefore, be decided by the courts. More generally, whether
certain overseas prisons may operate entirely unsupervised by the Ju-
dicial Branch of government will depend on how federal judges apply
Justice Kennedy's multifactor balancing test from Boumediene, and
73. Respondents' Motion to Dismiss First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at
1-2, Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 1:06-cv-01669).
74. Order at 2, Maqaleh v. Gates, Nos. 06-CV-1669 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 2009). The Executive
Order to which Judge Bates refers is Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities, Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74
Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009).
75. Government's Response to This Court's Order of January 22, 2009 at 2, Maqaleh v. Gates,
No. 06-cv-1669 (D.D.C. Feb. 20, 2009). In March 2009, President Obama responded to a journal-
ist's question about U.S. detention policy by stating that he had sent a "very clear edict" to his
Administration that "we ultimately provide anybody that we're detaining an opportunity
through habeas corpus to answer to charges." Helene Cooper & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama
Ponders Outreach to Elements of Taliban, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2009, at Al. This pronouncement
seemed at odds with the Administration's legal position in the Bagram habeas cases. According
to the Times, "Aides later said Mr. Obama did not mean to suggest that everybody held by
American forces would be granted habeas corpus or the right to challenge their detention." Id.
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whether they recognize its animating theory of the extraterritorial
reach of the Constitution.
III. THE LIMITED GOVERNMENT PRINCIPLE AND BOUMEDIENE
Boumediene required the U.S. Supreme Court to find common
threads in the complex and contradictory jurisprudence on the appli-
cation of the Constitution outside U.S. territory. Under Justice Ken-
nedy's leadership, the Boumediene majority adopted a self-styled
"functional approach" that drew on several competing and overlap-
ping theories of extraterritoriality.76 In selecting the factors for its
functional approach and in the emphasis it gave each factor in its anal-
ysis, the Court appeared to rely heavily on some theories while rele-
gating others to secondary status. In particular, the limited
government principle-that all government power, no matter where
or against whom it is exercised, is constrained by the Constitution-
undergirds and gives force to the Boumediene approach.
A. Theoretical Approaches to an Extraterritorial Constitution
The classically vexing question of how the Constitution should ap-
ply outside U.S. territory has attracted a vast wave of scholarly inter-
est in the years following 9/11. 77 What were once regarded as exotic
issues concerning the nuances of governance in remote U.S. territories
became urgent matters of national security in the wake of the U.S.
government's global detention scheme and the decision to operate
long-term prisons at Guantanamo and Bagram.78 In their purest
form, abstracted from the textures of particular contexts and cases,
extraterritoriality theories fall into two broad categories: membership
approaches, which contend that government power is limited only as it
applies within U.S. territory or against a privileged group of persons
with some connection to U.S. society, and globalist approaches, which
76. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2258.
77. See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG (2009); Christina
Duffy Burnett, A Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality After Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L.
REv. 973 (2009); J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution,
95 GEO. L.J. 463 (2007); Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene
v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259 (2009).
78. Globalization has, of course, played a role in bringing these issues to the fore. Other
nations have also struggled with how domestic courts should limit the exercise of their govern-
ments' actions beyond borders. See Chimne I. Keitner, Rights Beyond Borders (Univ. of Cal.,
Hastings Coll. of Law, Working Draft, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1480886 (iden-
tifying commonalities in approaches to extraterritoriality among courts in the United States,
Canada, and the United Kingdom).
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contend that the Constitution limits, in some fashion, the exercise of
government power everywhere and against everyone. 79
Important differences between membership and globalist ap-
proaches are often obscured, however, because the academic discus-
sion almost always focuses on which rights are afforded to which
persons in which locations. The debate as it is usually framed looks
like this: globalists argue for the universal applicability of constitu-
tional rights in some form, while membership adherents argue for lim-
iting the applicability of rights to privileged persons. The limited
government approach, while a species of globalism, illuminates gen-
eral aspects of extraterritoriality that are often ignored by such rights-
based, who-what-where inquiries.
Membership approaches begin with the view of the Constitution as
a compact between the government and the people.80 Noncitizens,
particularly those located outside U.S. territory, are not a party to this
compact and therefore possess limited, if any, entitlement to its pro-
tections. Two strands, territorialist and status theories, co-exist uncom-
fortably within the broader membership approach. A strict
territorialist theory would hold that the Constitution applies only
within U.S. territory. This view was most clearly expressed, if perhaps
only in dicta, by the Supreme Court in a nineteenth century case, In re
Ross: "The Constitution can have no operation in another country." '81
A strong form of status theory would extend protections only to U.S.
citizens. Neither strong form has prevailed in the doctrine, of course,
since both noncitizen permanent residents and U.S. citizens abroad
79. See Kent, supra note 77, at 468 (generally describing "globalists" as "argu[ing] that Ameri-
cans would never have tolerated that the constitutive document establishing their government
deem a person entirely defenseless against government power simply because of one's territorial
location, in the United States or abroad, or personal status, be it citizen or alien").
80. See, e.g., Keitner, supra note 78, at 8-10; Kent, supra note 77, at 489-90; Gerald L.
Neuman, Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 Lov. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2004); Eric. A. Posner,
Boumediene and the Uncertain March of Judicial Cosmopolitanism, 2007-2008 CATO SuP. CT.
REV. 23, 40-41; Kermit Roosevelt III, Guantanamo and the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and Beyond,
153 U. PA. L. REv. 2017, 2046-47 (2005).
81. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891). The petitioner in Ross was a seaman on an American
merchant vessel who was charged with the murder of a fellow crew member aboard the ship in a
harbor in Japan. The petitioner was tried and sentenced to death by a court consisting of the
U.S. Consul General and four U.S. citizens (although his sentence was later commuted and he
was imprisoned in the United States). The petitioner argued that this process deprived him of
the right to a grand jury indictment and jury trial. Id. at 458. Relying largely on the rationale
that the Constitution did not apply outside U.S. territory, the Court rejected his appeal. Id. at
480; see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and
the Nineteenth Century Origins of the Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1,
204-06 (2002) (discussing Ross).
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have been held unequivocally to be protected by the Constitution.
82
Professor Gerald Neuman has advocated a softer form of membership
theory, mutuality-of-obligation, which suggests that the government
must extend constitutional protections to noncitizens abroad when it
asserts a corresponding obligation of the noncitizen to obey legitimate
U.S. authority.83 Generally speaking, membership approaches have
been influential in the extraterritoriality jurisprudence, but as we dis-
cuss below, Boumediene substantially diminishes their importance.
Globalist approaches, in contrast, focus on the Constitution as re-
flecting the creation of a government whose powers are limited no
matter where or against whom they are exercised. These limits derive
from the fact that the government's powers are enumerated, rather
than plenary, and that these limitations reflect the values and aspira-
tions of the national community as embodied in the Constitution.
84
The strongest form of globalism is a pure universalist theory, contend-
ing that all constitutional rights extend to everyone everywhere. 85 A
softer, pragmatic approach, also referred to as "global due process,"
contends that certain rights have narrower or nonexistent applicability
abroad, depending on the circumstances. 8 6 The majority approach in
Boumediene is in many respects a global due process one.
87
A limited government approach is a unique species of globalism that
emphasizes the important distinction between limitations and rights,
both of which operate to constrain the exercise of government power,
82. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 12 (1957) (Black, J., plurality opinion) ("The Ross ap-
proach that the Constitution has no applicability abroad has long since been directly repudiated
by numerous cases.").
83. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 99-100 (1996). The exis-
tence of the obligation creates a presumption against which the government may make "specific
textual or other arguments [that] may exceptionally demonstrate that a particular right is either
reserved to citizens or geographically limited." Id. at 99.
84. Chimne Keitner refers to globalist approaches as "Constitution as Conscience." See
Keitner, supra note 78, at 10-11.
85. Many scholars of foreign affairs have argued that the Constitution should be interpreted
as extending the same rights-possibly in some more or less diluted form-to noncitizens abroad
as it does to U.S. citizens. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITU-
TION 305-07 (2d ed. 1996); David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional
Rights As Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 370-72 (2003); Jules Lobel, The Constitution
Abroad, 83 Am. J. INT'L L. 871, 875-76 (1989); cf. Jordan J. Paust, Post-9/11 Overreaction and
Fallacies Regarding War and Defense, Guantanamo, the Status of Persons, Treatment, Judicial
Review of Detention, and Due Process in Military Commissions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1335,
1350 (2004) (stating that "no human being is without protection under international law and the
types of protection are many"). This "universalist" approach is sometimes justified on the
ground that the Framers believed in natural rights and that they created a government of limited
powers. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra, at 306; Lobel, supra, at 875-76; see also NEUMAN, supra note
83, at 5-6 (describing this approach as "universalist").
86. See NEUMAN, supra note 83, at 113-17.
87. See Neuman, supra note 77, at 273.
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but in different ways. 88 Limitations describe the scope of the power
being exercised, while rights describe the particular entitlements that
shield the individual from government action. A searching inquiry
into the form and scope of the government's exercise of power should,
under a limited government approach, precede the analysis of
whether the person may invoke rights. At the initial, nonrights stage,
courts should ask whether the government action is within the scope
of the power granted to it by the Constitution; in other words, the
action should have a rational connection to an enumerated power. In
addition, courts should consider whether the action is constrained by
fundamental limits on the exercise of all government power. 89 Only
then should the courts look to the rights that individuals may possess,
which further limit the scope of the government's power against them.
Naturally, advocates of a membership approach criticize globalists
for what they view as an overly expansive understanding of the de-
mos.90 J. Andrew Kent has argued that little evidence exists in the
historical materials for an originalist, rights-based globalism.91 More-
over, unvarnished universalism implies some pretty absurd results: im-
agine, for example, that the Fourth Amendment requires U.S. Special
Forces to knock and announce before entering a terrorist's Pakistani
cave.92 A global due process approach properly takes account of such
difficulties, but it does not itself explain, by reference to founding era
principles, why rights should be enforceable abroad, nor does it give
courts guidance in weighing the importance of particular rights.93
A limited government approach, by contrast, has a strong originalist
pedigree. Indeed, as Sanford Levinson has observed, the "central
mantra of the founding generation" was that the Constitution estab-
lished a "limited government of assigned powers. ' 94 In Marbury v.
Madison, the Supreme Court declared that "the powers of the legisla-
88. See Robert Knowles & Marc D. Falkoff, Toward a Limited Government Theory of Extra-
territorial Detention, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 637, 648 (2007).
89. Id. at 666-68.
90. See Posner, supra note 80, at 35-36.
91. See Kent, supra note 77, at 485-91. Kent also offers originalist evidence for the proposi-
tion that the government's foreign affairs powers, if not unlimited, ought to be less constrained
than its domestic powers. See id. at 488-89. Although this is not the place to explore this topic,
we assume that foreign affairs powers are limited, both by the fact of their enumeration and by
other unexpressed principles. See Knowles & Falkoff, supra note 88, at 666-69.
92. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931-34 (1995) (establishing that the Fourth Amend-
ment requires police to "knock and announce" before entering a home with a search warrant).
93. See Knowles & Falkoff, supra note 88, at 661-64.
94. Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency, 40 GA. L.
REV. 699, 708 (2006); see also Knowles & Falkoff, supra note 88, at 644-45 (discussing founding
era views of limited government). The Constitution-as-compact view animating the membership
approach was rejected by some early commentators.
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ture are defined and limited. '95 Not only would the scope of the gov-
ernment's powers be limited by their enumeration, the founding
generation believed, but the exercise of those powers would also be
constrained by certain fundamental restrictions that are rooted in the
very nature of a just government.96
Because Boumediene appears to have enshrined globalism in Amer-
ican jurisprudence, it is important to recognize the form of globalism
that now most prominently informs the doctrine. A limited govern-
ment approach stands out as the best candidate because of its roots in
founding era principles and, as we discuss below, its persistent pres-
ence in extraterritoriality jurisprudence, including Boumediene.
B. The Extraterritorial Constitution, From the
Insular Cases to Boumediene
The jurisprudence on the extraterritorial application of the Consti-
tution can be understood as a series of arguments about the funda-
mental nature and limits of government power. On the surface at
least, Boumediene marked the triumph of a particular approach: the
"impracticable and anomalous" test, first articulated in 1957 by the
younger Justice Harlan in a concurring opinion of Reid v. Covert.97 In
1990, Justice Kennedy picked up on the test in his own concurring
opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez,98 and he ultimately applied it on behalf
of the majority in Boumediene.99 This inquiry-which looks to the
particular circumstances of the case to determine whether the applica-
tion of a particular constitutional provision is "impracticable and
anomalous"-is a species of globalism. However, as we have argued
elsewhere, this now-reigning approach derives its power and authority
not from its pragmatism, malleability, and sensitivity to policy, but
from the principle of limited government.100
It would, indeed, be an extraordinary use of language to consider a declaration of rights
in a constitution, and especially of rights, which it proclaims to be "unalienable and
indefeasible," to be a matter of contract, and resting on such a basis, rather than a
solemn recognition and admission of those rights, arising from the law of nature, and
the gift of Providence, and incapable of being transferred or surrendered.
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 340, at 309
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833).
95. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803).
96. See Knowles & Falkoff, supra note 88, at 668-69.
97. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring).
98. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277-78 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
99. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2255-56 (2008).
100. See Knowles & Falkoff, supra note 88, at 656-67.
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As may be discerned from the Boumediene decision itself, Justice
Kennedy's understanding of the extraterritorial application of the
Constitution has its roots in the so-called Insular Cases, a series of
decisions reached at the turn of the twentieth century following the
Spanish-American War.' 10 These cases each addressed whether par-
ticular constitutional provisions applied to litigants in newly acquired
U.S. territories, including Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Hawaii. 10 2
Although none of the Insular Cases directly addressed extraterritorial-
ity per se, their reasoning has long influenced the Supreme Court's
understanding of the reach of the Constitution and the limits of fed-
eral power outside of the territorial United States.10 3
Among the Insular Cases, Downes v. Bidwell contains the Court's
fullest exploration of the principles governing extraterritoriality. 10 4 In
Downes, the Court held that Congress could tax imports from Puerto
Rico despite the Constitution's explicit prohibition on taxing imports
from any state, and despite the Court's earlier holding that Puerto
Rico was "part of the United States.' 0 5 Justice Brown announced the
judgment of the Court and seemed to suggest that Congress could
choose whether and how to extend the Constitution to the territo-
ries.10 6 But Justice Brown's opinion had a relatively minor impact.
Instead, it was Justice White's concurring opinion, and the doctrine of
territorial incorporation that it articulated, that was applied in the
other Insular Cases and that shaped the extraterritoriality jurispru-
101. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2253-55.
102. See Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 139 (1904) (Philippines); Hawaii v. Mankichi,
190 U.S. 197, 211, 217 (1903) (Hawaii); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 1-2, 200 (1901) (Puerto
Rico); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221, 221-22 (1901) (Puerto Rico and Hawaii); Dooley v.
United States (Dooley 1), 182 U.S. 222, 235-36 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243,
244 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) (Puerto Rico); Huus v. New York & Porto
Rico Steamship Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901); Dooley v. United States (Dooley I1), 183 U.S. 151, 157
(1901); Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176, 177 (1901).
103. Indeed, the Insular Cases were discussed by the Boumediene majority in some detail. See
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2253-55 (2008). See generally Christina Duffy Burnett,
Untied States: American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. CHi. L. REV. 797 (2005)
(discussing the importance of the Insular Cases).
104. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
105. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 250-51. The Court had concluded that Puerto Rico was part of
the United States in Dooley 1, 182 U.S. at 235.
106. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 278-79. Justice Brown was inconsistent on this point. Later he
also acknowledged that the Constitution contains certain "prohibitions [that] go to the very root
of the power of Congress to act at all, irrespective of time or place." Id. at 277. In any event,
this concept was explicitly rejected by the majority in Boumediene. See 128 S. Ct. at 2258-59
("The Constitution grants Congress and the President the power to acquire, dispose of, and
govern territory, not the power to decide when and where its terms apply.").
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dence.' 0 7 Under the commonly understood interpretation of the ad-
mittedly murky territorial incorporation doctrine, all constitutional
rights apply in full to "incorporated" territories-apparently, those
destined for statehood-while in so-called "unincorporated territo-
ries," only "fundamental" rights apply.10 8
Yet it is important to note that a clear majority, if not all, of the
Justices in Downes endorsed the concept that the Constitution limits
the exercise of government power, at least in some fashion, no matter
where or against whom the power is exercised. In fact, Downes is best
understood as a colloquy on the appropriate application of a limited
government approach.10 9 Justice Fuller's dissenting opinion, joined by
three other Justices, demanded strict adherence to the limited govern-
ment principle. 110 Yet even Justice Brown, who took the most expan-
sive view of federal power, acknowledged the existence of
"prohibitions [that] go to the very root of the power of Congress to act
at all, irrespective of time or place," mentioning as examples the pro-
visions forbidding ex post facto laws, titles of nobility, and even the
First Amendment."'
Most important, however, was Justice White's concurrence, which
advanced the territorial incorporation doctrine within a limited gov-
ernment frame." 2 "The government of the United States," he ex-
plained, "was born of the Constitution, and all powers which it enjoys
or may exercise must be either derived expressly or by implication
107. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 288-89 (White, J., concurring). Justice Gray declared that he
agreed "in substance" with Justice White, but emphasized the fact that the case involved a tem-
porary government. Id. at 345-46 (Gray, J., concurring).
108. See id. at 291 (White, J., concurring). The conventional understanding is that "funda-
mental" rights apply in unincorporated territories. See NEUMAN, supra note 83, at 87. However,
we believe that this description can be misleading because Justice White did not speak in terms
of rights, but in terms of limits on government power. See Roosevelt, supra note 80, at 2034-35
& n.89.
109. This is the understanding of the Court in Boumediene:
As the Court later made clear, "the real issue in the Insular Cases was not whether the
Constitution extended to the Philippines or Porto Rico..., but which of its provisions
were applicable by way of limitation upon the exercise of executive and legislative
power in dealing with new conditions and requirements."
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2254-55 (quoting Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922)).
110. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 359 (1901) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) ("The powers
delegated by the people to their agents are not enlarged by the expansion of the domain within
which they are exercised. When the restriction on the exercise of a particular power by a partic-
ular agent is ascertained, that is an end of question.").
111. Id. at 277. In Lamont v. Woods, the Second Circuit concluded that an overseas religious
program violated the Establishment Clause, relying on Downes for the proposition that "the
constitutional prohibition against establishments of religion targets the competency of Congress
to enact legislation of that description-irrespective of time or place." 948 F.2d 825, 834-35 (2d
Cir. 1991).
112. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 288-89 (White, J., concurring).
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from that instrument."' 13 In somewhat obscure language, Justice
White recognized at least three ways in which the Constitution limits
government power, even in "unincorporated" territories. First, there
are "regulations as to the form and manner in which a conceded
power may be exercised. ' 114 Second, there exist "inherent, although
unexpressed, principles which are the basis of all free government
[and] cannot be with impunity transcended .. .[,] restrictions of so
fundamental a nature that they cannot be transgressed, although not
expressed in so many words in the Constitution.""1l5 Finally, there are
in the Constitution's text "general prohibitions . . .in favor of the
liberty and property of the citizen ... which are an absolute denial of
all authority under any circumstances or conditions to do particular
acts," and which are "limitations ... [that] cannot be under any cir-
cumstances transcended, because of the complete absence of
power." 116 Of these three government-limiting types-(1) form and
manner regulations, (2) unexpressed fundamental restrictions, and (3)
general textual prohibitions-only the third potentially describes
rights as the term is now usually employed in constitutional
jurisprudence. 117
It is ironic that such a rich exploration of limited government can be
found in a decision that was arguably driven by political considera-
tions, recognizing expansive government power abroad and granting
constitutional status to colonialism at least in part on racist grounds."18
Nonetheless, the Downes opinion's emphasis on limited government
yields useful insights for making sense of Boumediene. Importantly,
Downes suggests that the powers of government must be analyzed in
two steps: First, has the government been authorized by the Constitu-
113. Id. at 288 (White, J., concurring); see also id. at 297-98 (White, J., concurring) (asserting
that "those absolute withdrawals of power which the Constitution has made in favor of human
liberty are applicable to every condition or status").
114. Id. at 294 (White, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 291 (White, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 294-95 (White, J., concurring).
117. Unexpressed prohibitions, of course, may be described as natural rights. See RANDY
BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 60-71 (2004);
Knowles & Falkoff, supra note 88, at 646-47.
118. See Neuman, supra note 80, at 11 (criticizing the "frank racism and enthusiastic colonial-
ism" in Downes); cf. Downes, 182 U.S. at 306 (White, J., concurring) (concluding that the United
States had a right, as a sovereign nation on par with the European powers, to "protect the birth-
right of its own citizens" by withholding citizenship from people in the acquired territories that
belonged to "an uncivilized race" and could be "absolutely unfit to receive it"); GARY LAWSON
& GuY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE 137 (2004) (critiquing the territorial incorpo-
ration doctrine as confusing and ill-founded). For an argument that the territorial incorporation
doctrine served primarily to ensure that the United States could relinquish control of those terri-
tories less conducive to permanent U.S. governance, see generally Burnett, supra note 103.
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tion to act in the form and manner that it has? Second, if the govern-
ment has been authorized to act, do expressed or unexpressed
restrictions further constrain the exercise of its power? 119 After these
inquiries, a third step involves asking whether the extraterritorial con-
text requires that the content of expressed rights be modified for prag-
matic reasons.120
The conversation about limited government that began in Downes
continued in later cases, even though status and territoriality ap-
proaches sometimes appeared to predominate. In Johnson v. Eisen-
trager, the Court held that habeas jurisdiction did not extend to
petitions by German nationals who had been captured by U.S. forces
in China and who had been accused of aiding the Japanese military in
violation of Germany's surrender terms.121 The prisoners were tried,
convicted, and sentenced by a congressionally authorized military
commission, then transferred to Landsberg Prison, a U.S. military
base in occupied Germany. The Eisentrager majority appeared at first
to dismiss the petitions on almost purely territoriality and status
grounds: enemy aliens captured and held abroad simply lack access to
the writ.122 But as Justice Kennedy would later observe in
Boumediene, the Eisentrager Court's analysis was actually more com-
plex. 123 The Court went on to consider other factors before announc-
ing its holding; the defendants were admitted enemy aliens tried and
convicted by military commission, and numerous practical obstacles
would have made the operation of habeas exceedingly difficult in a
large overseas occupied territory.1 24 These latter considerations are
examples of the government-limiting types discussed by Justice White
119. Justice White's limited government approach to the extraterritorial reach of the Constitu-
tion was explicitly adopted by the Court in Dorr v. United States, a case that addressed the right
to trial by jury in the unincorporated territory of the Philippines. See Dorr v. United States, 195
U.S. 138, 140 (1904). "It may be regarded as settled," the Court explained, "that the Constitu-
tion of the United States is the only source of power authorizing action by any branch of the
Federal Government." Id. at 140.
120. Christina Duffy Burnett recently offered an interpretation of the Insular Cases emphasiz-
ing the distinction between the second and third steps. See Burnett, Convenient Constitution,
supra note 77, at 980, 1031-33.
121. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765-67 (1950).
122. See id. at 768. The Court continued, "[I]n extending constitutional protections beyond
the citizenry, the Court has been at pains to point out that it was the alien's presence within its
territorial jurisdiction that gave the Judiciary power to act." Id. at 771. Though Justice Jackson
in fact considered the substance of the Germans' claims, he rejected their argument that the
Fifth Amendment "confer[red] a right of personal security or an immunity from military trial
and punishment upon an alien enemy engaged in the hostile service of a government at war with
the United States." Id. at 785.
123. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2257-58 (2008).
124. See id. at 2257-61.
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in Downes: the Eisentrager Court explored the form and manner in
which the government had denied habeas to the prisoners and, possi-
bly, whether the procedures afforded to them breached some unex-
pressed principles that limited all government power.
The reduced importance of territoriality became clear in Reid v.
Covert, a 1956 decision holding that the right to a jury trial extended
to servicemen's civilian widows who were U.S. citizens located over-
seas and who had been accused of capital crimes. 125 Justice Black's
plurality opinion established that American citizen civilians may in-
voke full constitutional protections against their government any-
where in the world, reinforcing and expanding, in many respects, the
limited government theme of Downes.126 Reid "reject[ed] the idea
that when the United States acts against citizens abroad it can do so
free of the Bill of Rights. ' 127 Moreover, Justice Black stated, "The
United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and
authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all
the limitations imposed by the Constitution.' 12 8
Justices Harlan and Frankfurter concurred in the Reid result, but
their separate opinions offered a more nuanced gloss on extraterritori-
ality. Justice Harlan's approach, ultimately adopted by the full Court
in Boumediene, articulated a two-step analysis. First, he addressed the
threshold question of whether the government power being invoked
(in this case, Congress's Article I power to regulate the armed forces)
bore a rational connection to its exercise (the trial, conviction, and
imposition of the death penalty by court martial without a jury trial on
civilian spouses of service members who were located abroad), t 29
This first step is a question of limited government. The second in-
quiry, whether rights limit the legitimate exercise of that power, "can
be reduced to the issue of what process is 'due' a defendant in the
particular circumstances of a particular case. ' 130 Although Congress's
125. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 32-33, 40-41 (1957).
126. See id. at 8-9 & n.10. Justice Black, who believed in the wholesale incorporation of the
Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment, clearly disliked the incorporation doctrine. See
NEUMAN, supra note 83, at 91.
127. Reid, 354 U.S. at 5.
128. Id. at 5-6. In this respect, Justice Black's opinion was strikingly similar to that of the
D.C. Circuit opinion that was eventually overruled in Eisentrager. See Eisentrager v. Forrestal,
174 F.2d 961, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
129. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 70 (Harlan, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 75 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy quoted this language in his Verdugo-
Urquidez concurrence. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter's concurrence also emphasized the limited government
principle but differed from Justice Harlan in that he did not separate the limited government
inquiry from the rights inquiry, but instead balanced the two together. Compare Reid, 354 U.S.
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power extended to the court martial in the case, Harlan concluded
that the defendants' Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to a grand jury
and jury trial in Article III courts prohibited the government from
exercising this power. 13t
In a series of majority opinions in 1960, the Court extended the
Reid holding to require a jury trial in civilian court for service mem-
bers' dependents and civilian employees of the military, even for non-
capital crimes.132 In Kinsella, the Court acknowledged Article III and
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as sources of the defendant's rights,
but focused nearly all of its attention on the scope of congressional
power and whether it included courts martial for civilian depen-
dents.1 33 Observing no practical differences from Reid, the Court re-
jected the government's contention that providing access to Article III
courts would have a critical impact on military discipline and declined
to engage in "fresh balancing" of the government's asserted power
against the defendant's rights. The scope of the government's power
alone determined the issue: due process could not, the Court held,
expand government power where it did not exist.1 34
Thirty years later, the Court decided Verdugo-Urquidez, a decision
appearing to adopt a membership approach that was rooted largely in
the status of the person against whom government power was exer-
cised. The Court declined to apply the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement to the seizure by U.S. agents of property located in Mex-
ico and owned by a Mexican national. 135 In his opinion for the Court,
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the reference to "the people"
at 53 (Frankfurter, J., concurring), with id. at 66 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("The powers of Con-
gress . . . are constitutionally circumscribed. Under the Constitution Congress has only such
powers as are expressly granted or those that are implied as reasonably necessary and proper to
carry out the granted powers.").
131. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 75 (Harlan, J., concurring).
132. As Gerald Neuman has observed, the Supreme Court itself seems to have disregarded
the fact that the Reid plurality reasoning was adopted by the majority in later cases involving
U.S. citizens abroad. See Neuman, supra note 80, at 12-13 & n.64; see also Kinsella v. United
States, 361 U.S. 234, 249 (1960) (extending Reid v. Covert to dependents of service personnel
accused of noncapital crimes); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278, 280 (1960) (extending the Reid
holding to civilian employees of the armed forces accused of capital crimes); McElroy v. Guag-
liardo, 361 U.S. 281, 284 (1960) (extending the holding to civilian employees of the armed forces
accused of noncapital crimes).
133. See Kinsella, 361 U.S. at 249.
134. See id. at 246 ("Due process cannot create or enlarge power.... It deals neither with
power nor with jurisdiction, but with their exercise." (citations omitted)). The Court discussed
and cited historical materials explaining that the Necessary and Proper Clause did not expand
the scope of powers that were delimited by the fact of their enumeration. See id. at 247-48.
135. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274-75.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
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in the Amendment limits its application to "a class of persons who are
part of a national community or who have otherwise developed suffi-
cient connection with this country to be considered part of that com-
munity."136 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion offered a constricted
interpretation of Reid that rejected the significance of the broad lim-
ited government, even universalist, principles articulated in Justice
Black's plurality, insisting that the controlling aspect was the narrower
ground that the defendants were U.S. citizens. 137
However, Justice Kennedy, who had provided the fifth vote for the
majority, wrote separately to provide "some explanation of [his]
views," which, despite his assurances to the contrary, departed signifi-
cantly from Chief Justice Rehnquist's. 138 Justice Kennedy adhered to
a globalist approach, rather than a membership approach, to extrater-
ritoriality. He declined to accept sweeping generalizations about the
inapplicability of the Constitution to noncitizens abroad. Instead, spe-
cifically relying on and quoting from Justice Harlan's Reid concur-
rence, Justice Kennedy focused on the particular "conditions and
considerations" of particular cases, inquiring whether the application
of certain constitutional provisions in certain circumstances would be
"impracticable and anomalous. ' 139 The "first step," he wrote, was the
principle that "the Government may act only as the Constitution au-
thorizes, whether the actions in question are foreign or domestic.'
140
He then quoted extensively from Justice Harlan's concurrence and
used identical language to evaluate whether the application of the
Fourth Amendment to this presumably valid exercise of government
power-the extraterritorial search of Verdugo-Urquidez's home-
would be "impracticable and anomalous."'1 41
As the last Supreme Court decision addressing extraterritoriality
prior to 9/11, Verdugo-Urquidez led to the widespread belief that the
membership approach shaped the doctrine, obscuring the surprisingly
dominant strain of globalist, limited government thinking that runs
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV. The defendant in Verdugo-Urquidez was detained in a San Diego
prison while Drug Enforcement Agency agents searched his home in Mexico, where they ob-
tained evidence that they then sought to use against the defendant in his trial in the United
States. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274-75.
136. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
137. See id.; Neuman, supra note 80, at 12-13 & n.64.
138. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
139. Id. at 277-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
140. Id. at 277.
141. Id. at 277-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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through the full range of these extraterritoriality cases and that ani-
mates even the "global due process" approach advocated by Justice
Kennedy.142 The existence of this limited government strain set the
stage for the Court's rejection of the membership approach in
Boumediene.
C. Boumediene As a Limited Government Decision
Boumediene was a landmark case in several respects. For the first
time, the Court invalidated a federal statute that stripped jurisdiction
from the federal courts; also for the first time, the Court held that an
alternative review mechanism established by Congress violated the
Suspension Clause.143 The government did not suspend the writ but
argued instead that it did not exist for aliens at Guantanamo. 144 The
Court rejected this contention, confirming that habeas delimits the
scope of Congress's power even when exercised outside the sovereign
territory of the United States. The Suspension Clause can be under-
stood as both providing a right and, as the Court put it, "an indispen-
sable mechanism for monitoring the separation of powers. ' 145 The
Court's approach emphasized not rights, but limitations. Commen-
tary about Boumediene has focused almost exclusively on the prag-
matic dimension of the majority's approach to extraterritorial
detention. 146 But this focus-and the heated debate about whether it
is appropriate to grant the detainee's particular rights-tends to ob-
scure the theoretical foundations of the approach to extraterritoriality
employed by the Court. At its core, Boumediene is best understood as
relying on not a theory of rights or pragmatism, but a theory of limited
government.
The Supreme Court in Boumediene struck down § 7 of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, which had purported to withdraw jurisdic-
142. Knowles & Falkoff, supra note 88, at 656-57.
143. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2240. For a discussion of Boumediene's historical importance,
see, for example, Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Guantanamo: The
Boumediene Decision, 2009 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 1.
144. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262 ("The MCA does not purport to be a formal suspension
of the writ; and the Government, in its submissions to us, has not argued that it is. Petitioners,
therefore, are entitled to the privilege of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their
detention.").
145. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259. For a discussion of these two dimensions of the Suspen-
sion Clause, see Stephen Vladeck, The Suspension Clause As a Structural Right, 62 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 275, 302-03 (2009).
146. For scholarly analyses that emphasize the pragmatic nature of Boumediene, see Neuman,
supra note 77; Burnett, supra note 77; David Jenkins, Habeas Corpus and Extraterritorial Juris-
diction After Boumediene: Towards a Doctrine of "Effective Control" in the United States, 9
HuM. RTS. L. REV. 306 (2009).
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tion from federal courts to consider habeas corpus petitions from de-
tainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.147 Justice Kennedy, writing
for the majority of five, rejected the government's argument that it
could deny habeas to the detainees because they were foreign nation-
als who were located outside the sovereign territory of the United
States.148 After an extensive survey of the geographical reach of
habeas before 1787-treading much of the same ground covered in
Rasul-the majority deemed the historical evidence "inconclusive,"
but rejected de jure sovereignty as the "touchstone" for the exercise
of habeas jurisdiction.149
The lengthy discussion about the history of habeas served as a re-
sponse to Justice Scalia's dissent, an originalist argument against juris-
diction. 150  The inconclusiveness of this debate allowed Justice
Kennedy to expand on the views he had first articulated in his
Verdugo-Urquidez concurrence.' 51 In attempting to make sense of the
obscure and difficult jurisprudence on the extraterritorial application
of the Constitution, Justice Kennedy found "a common thread uniting
the Insular Cases, Eisentrager, and Reid: the idea that questions of
extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not
formalism. ' 152  To the profound questions before it, the Court
adopted what it called a "functional approach," under which it would
consider many factors, including "(1) the citizenship and status of the
detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that status
determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehen-
sion and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles in-
herent in resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the writ."'1 53
The Court weighed these factors together to conclude that habeas
"has full effect at Guantanamo Bay."'1 54 The first factor favored the
petitioners because the CSRT process fell "well short of the proce-
dures and adversarial mechanisms that would eliminate the need for
147. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008).
148. See id. at 2240, 2253.
149. Id. at 2252-53. For a discussion of the role three types of sovereignty-de jure, de facto,
and practical-play in Boumediene, see Anthony Colangelo, "De Facto Sovereignty":
Boumediene and Beyond, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 623 (2009).
150. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2303 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The debate between the ma-
jority and the dissenters over the meaning of the historical materials mirrors, in its inconclusive-
ness, the scholarly debates about the original meaning of the Constitution's allocation of foreign
affairs powers. See Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution,
41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 94-99, 110 (2009).
151. See supra notes 138-142 and accompanying text.
152. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2258.
153. Id. at 2259.
154. Id. at 2262.
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habeas corpus review. ' 155 With respect to the second factor, the
Court distinguished Guantanamo from Landsberg Prison in Eisen-
trager on the ground that the United States maintained indefinite and
absolute control over the base without having to answer to its allies.
156
With respect to the third factor, the majority emphasized that Guanta-
namo is a small geographic area located far from an active theater of
war, that "friction with the host government" was not an issue given
the totality of U.S. control, and that the government had failed to
show that habeas would impair the military mission at the base.
157
Although Kennedy's opinion explicitly eschews "formalism," it
does draw on formal theories of the extraterritorial Constitution.
Limited government is the star, but other approaches persist in minor
roles. Territoriality, for example, remains significant. If the detainees
were held within sovereign United States territory, the Court arguably
need not have resorted to its functional approach at all. Territoriality
also informs the Court's discussion of jurisdiction and control by the
United States.1 58 The status of the detainees, too, has some relevance.
However, Boumediene substantially reduced the importance of the
membership theory that had animated Chief Justice Rehnquist's
Verdugo-Urquidez majority opinion.1 59 Had this membership ap-
proach governed exclusively, the detainees would have been held to
lack habeas rights because, as noncitizens located abroad with no vol-
untary connection to U.S. society, they are among the least entitled to
the Constitution's protections.160 Nonetheless, as Gerald Neuman has
observed, if one views habeas corpus as a right, then the Court "would
seem to need some presumptive category of foreign nationals abroad
155. Id. at 2259-60.
156. See id. at 2260; see also Neuman, supra note 77, at 267.
157. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2261-62.
158. Anthony Colangelo has identified "de facto sovereignty" as lying at the core of the
Court's application of the writ to Guantanamo: because the Guantanamo Lease provides the
United States with complete jurisdiction and control over the base and its laws therefore apply
exclusively, the writ runs. See Colangelo, supra note 149, at 626-27. Although this account
explains a great deal about the result in Boumediene, it does not, in our view, fully explain why
the Court would need to reach as far as it did beyond the lease and evaluate such factors as the
military mission at the base, the amount of time the detainees had been in captivity, the detain-
ees' citizenship status, their proximity to the battlefield, and other aspects of the situation seem-
ingly unrelated to jurisdiction or control.
159. See Neuman, supra note 77, at 272 (concluding that "Boumediene provides a long over-
due repudiation of Rehnquist's opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez"); David D. Cole, Rights over Bor-
ders: Transnational Constitutionalism and Guantanamo Bay, 2007-2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 47,
51.
160. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit relied, not unreasonably, on the Verdugo-Urquidez majority's
membership approach in concluding that the detainees lacked constitutional rights. See
Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 991-92 (2007).
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whose interests the Constitution protects in order to make a function-
alist evaluation."' 161 Perhaps the fact that the detainees were in U.S.
custody allowed the Court to slightly expand the membership circle in
order to accommodate them. 162 Indeed, one critic of the decision has
argued that the hidden core of Justice Kennedy's Boumediene opinion
is a "cosmopolitan theory" under which judges have a constitutional
obligation to protect the rights of noncitizens.163
In addition to territoriality and membership principles, the Court
can even be seen as drawing on a soft form of the mutuality-of-obliga-
tion theory that was advocated by Professor Neuman. This is a differ-
ent way to interpret the Court's focus on the fact that the United
States has exclusive jurisdiction at the base: because U.S. law is the
only law applicable to the detainees and the sole source of the proce-
dures and substantive standards under which their detention would be
evaluated, the detainees are entitled to at least some protections pro-
vided by that same law. Of course, most detainees have not been
charged with crimes under U.S. law, and they were taken to Guanta-
namo because it was believed-mistakenly, it turns out-to be a law-
free zone. And although the government invokes the law of war as a
basis for holding the detainees, it does not seek their obedience to its
legitimate authority.164
It is not surprising that the Court relied on other theories in giving
content to the factors in its functionalist approach. Indeed, it is both a
strength and weakness of pragmatic, "global due process" approaches
that they must necessarily be hybrids constructed from other theo-
ries. 165 The advantage of a malleable approach is that the Court can
prevent particularly egregious injustices that result from adhering
slavishly to a particular paradigm. 166 Moreover, as Justice Kennedy
observed, the Court conserves judicial resources by adopting a func-
tional approach because it avoids interfering with the political
161. See Neuman, supra note 77, at 271. This does not mean, however, that the Court has
adopted a form of universalism; Justice Kennedy appears to have ruled out the possibility that
the U.S. Constitution extends rights to everyone throughout the globe. Id. at 271-72.
162. See id. at 271.
163. Posner, supra note 80, at 23-25.
164. See NEUMAN, supra note 83, at 99-100; Knowles & Falkoff, supra note 88, at 661.
165. Knowles & Falkoff, supra note 88, at 662.
166. See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 77, at 272 (discussing Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596,
603-04 (D.C. Cir. 2000), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403
(2002), and asserting that it held, based on Verdugo-Urquidez and its membership approach, that
the Constitution generally permits U.S. agents to torture foreign national abroad).
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branches' activities unless it is truly necessary to preserve constitu-
tional values. 167
On the other hand, there are two significant difficulties with func-
tional approaches, both of which were raised by the Boumediene dis-
senters. First, functional approaches create uncertainty, and they risk
arrogating judicial power.168 The political branches, having relied on
previous understandings about extraterritoriality rooted in member-
ship approaches, could feel that they are victims of "a constitutional
bait and switch."'1 69 Second, functional approaches are susceptible to
an endless cat-and-mouse game between the courts and the political
branches: the court holds that habeas extends to Guantanamo, so the
political branches move the detainees to a location that lacks exclusive
U.S. jurisdiction and control, and that is closer to the battlefield; the
court responds by declaring, for other reasons, that the writ still runs;
and so on. 170
These criticisms have merit, but they tend to obscure the distinction
between functional approaches that draw on multiple rights-based
theories of extraterritoriality and functional approaches that examine
the policies and procedures utilized by the political branches. 171
Moreover, critics rarely identify or discuss the stage of analysis at
which functionalism is employed by the Court. Christina Duffy Bur-
nett argues that the Court "took a wrong turn" with the "impractica-
ble and anomalous" test because it failed to acknowledge the
difference between the applicability and content of constitutional pro-
visions. 172 As a result, lower courts appear to be deploying functional-
167. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2255 (2008) ("[T]he Court devised in the Insu-
lar Cases a doctrine that allowed it to use its power sparingly and where it would be most
needed. This century-old doctrine informs our analysis in the present matter.").
168. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2302-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[It is the Court's 'func-
tional' test that does not (and never will) provide clear guidance for the future.... [and] is so
inherently subjective that it clears a wide path for the Court to traverse in the years to come.").
169. Id. at 2285 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("Congress followed the Court's lead, only to find
itself the victim of a constitutional bait and switch."). Chief Justice Roberts used the expression
here to refer to the Court's apparent invitation to Congress to legislate regarding the detainees,
only to reject Congress's ultimate decision to strip habeas jurisdiction. See id.
170. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2285 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Knowles & Falkoff, supra
note 88, at 663.
171. For a discussion of the role that functionalism plays in foreign affairs, see Knowles, supra
note 150, at 94-100; Deborah N. Pearlstein, Form and Function in the National Security Constitu-
tion, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1549 (2009).
172. Burnett, supra note 77, at 1042; see also id. at 1031 (concluding that "the 'impracticable
and anomalous' test has subordinated constitutional guarantees to functional considerations,
even as it has paid lip service to the notion that the Constitution does not stop at the border" and
that it "allows for the replacement of considerations of text, structure, history, and precedent
with an investigation of whatever strikes a court as appropriate considerations in any given
case").
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ism before it is necessary, thereby reducing certainty in the doctrine.
For Burnett, functional considerations should only be introduced after
the Court has already determined that a particular provision ap-
plies. 173 Similarly, as we have argued, analyses of extraterritoriality
frequently fail to distinguish between the content of government
power and the content of applicable rights. In our view, then, courts
should engage in a three-step process when evaluating an extraterrito-
rial exercise of government power: (1) Is the action taken by the gov-
ernment within the scope of the power granted to it by the
Constitution? (2) Which constitutional rights limit the exercise of that
power? (3) Which prudential considerations should modify the con-
tent of the right in this particular context?
Our limited government approach emphasizes that the Courts must
first address the scope of government power on its own terms before
discussing applicable rights. At this first stage, they will need to take
into account the circumstances in which the power is exercised, the
purpose and history of its exercise, and the fundamental limits that
constrain the exercise of all government power. Some of these consid-
erations may be described as "functional," while others may be de-
scribed as "formalist.' 1 74
Although the U.S. Supreme Court does not explicitly employ this
three-step analysis, what is striking about Boumediene is the degree to
which the Court's holding hinges on the nature of the exercise of gov-
ernment power rather than the rights afforded to the detainees as
aliens located abroad. In other words, the considerations most impor-
tant for the Court's conclusions relate to whether the exercise of
power is authorized by the Constitution. In this critical respect, lim-
ited government, rather than pragmatism for its own sake, is the domi-
nant theory animating the Court's functional approach. "Even when
the United States acts outside its borders," Justice Kennedy wrote,
"its powers are not 'absolute and unlimited' but are subject 'to such
restrictions as are expressed in the Constitution.' 1 75 Habeas was de-
scribed as "an indispensable mechanism for monitoring the separation
173. See id. at 981. For Burnett, in the initial stage a court should determine "what constitu-
tional provisions authorize the power being exercised, and what constitutional provisions limit
it." Id. at 1032. We believe that it is important to separate the two phases of the initial stage.
174. Functionalism has no precise meaning; the boundaries between formalism and function-
alism are blurry, and there is much overlap between the two broad approaches to constitutional
interpretation. See Pearlstein, supra note 171, at 1555-86; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships
Between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PuB.
POL'Y 21, 21-22 (1998).
175. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2259 (2008) (quoting Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S.
15, 44 (1885) (discussing congressional power over the Utah territory)).
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of powers.' 7 6 And the Court stated that it needed to examine the
circumstances of the case to ensure that the political branches could
not "turn the Constitution on or off at will." 177
Although the Court concluded that Guantanamo is, "for all practi-
cal purposes, U.S. territory," this was not the determinative fact; if it
had been, the Court would not have needed to discuss the other fac-
tors. Instead, the Court explored the purposes of the government
power being exercised: the President's power as Commander in Chief
to capture enemy belligerents; Congress's power to make rules for
"Captures on Land and Water";178 and most importantly, Congress's
power to limit the applicability of habeas under the Suspension
Clause. 179 In discussing the first factor, Justice Kennedy focused en-
tirely on the adequacy of process without exploring the detainees' sta-
tus. When Kennedy finally did mention the status of the detainees
toward the end of the opinion, he did so only to emphasize the length
of their detention. 180 The rest of the analysis was devoted to a discus-
sion of logistics-the distance between Guantanamo and the battle-
field, the difficulty of conducting habeas hearings, and the connection
between the suspension of habeas and the military mission at the
base. 81
There is no question that rights-based approaches play some role in
Boumediene, but their role appears far stronger at first blush than on
closer examination. Justice Kennedy framed the issue as whether the
detainees had the "privilege" of habeas corpus, and habeas was re-
ferred to as a "right" several times in the opinion. 18 2 Nonetheless, the
Court's discussion of habeas continually returned to its limited gov-
ernment purposes.183 And again, the lion's share of the Court's analy-
sis was devoted to what is essentially a limited government inquiry.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 2277; U.S. CON sT. art I, § 8, cl. 11.
179. See id. at 2277; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004) (holding that Congress
authorized the President to detain enemy combatants in the war against al Qaeda and the
Taliban).
180. See id. at 2275. Posner, supra note 80, at 30 (questioning the relevance to the determina-
tion of extraterritorial habeas of the Court; emphasis on the length of detention).
181. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2251-74.
182. See, e.g., id. at 2260 (observing that "the sites of [the detainees'] apprehension and deten-
tion are technically outside the sovereign territory of the United States" and that "this is a factor
that weighs against finding they have rights under the Suspension Clause"); id. at 2277 ("Liberty
and security can be reconciled; and in our system they are reconciled within the framework of
the law. The Framers decided that habeas corpus, a right of first importance, must be a part of
that framework, a part of that law.").
183. See id. at 2246-47 (discussing sources from the founding era and observing that "Alexan-
der Hamilton likewise explained that by providing the detainee a judicial forum to challenge
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The Court's focus on the separation of powers, rather than rights,
makes sense if, as Stephen Vladeck has persuasively argued, habeas is
best understood not merely as a "right" in the commonly intended
sense, but as a structural limitation that constrains the exercise of all
government power-a background principle against which the Sus-
pension Clause provides for a limited exception.184 The true issue in
Boumediene, then, was not whether the detainees possessed the right
to habeas; it was whether Congress had acted within the scope of its
power under the Suspension Clause to abrogate habeas at Guanta-
namo given the time and distance from the battlefield, the process
provided the detainees, and the military's mission.
One can discern in Boumediene an application of our three-step
limited government approach. Under the first step, the Court consid-
ered the scope of enumerated powers and the existence of an unex-
pressed constraint provided by the structural limitation of habeas.
Having determined that Congress lacked the power to abrogate
habeas, it was not necessary for the Court to reach the second step-
whether the detainees possessed rights that would further limit that
power. Nonetheless, the discussion of habeas as a right or privilege
may be a sign that the Court was in some sense doing so. At the third
stage, pragmatic considerations come to the fore, although again it
was not necessary in Boumediene for the Court to consider the practi-
cal constraints that may limit the content of habeas in an extraterrito-
rial context. The Court nonetheless provided guidelines for future
cases: Habeas would be available some time well after capture, only
after the Executive Branch had made its own determination of a de-
tainee's status; and extra allowances should be made for domestic,
emergency situations. 185 Of course, the Court did not analyze the is-
sue precisely in this way. But that may be more the result of an at-
tempt to synthesize a complex jurisprudence than an indication that
the Court's approach to future extraterritoriality cases will be purely
"pragmatic." Functionalism suffuses Boumediene, to be sure, but
functionalism is used by the Court, not for its own sake, but to better
define the limits of government power.
detention, the writ preserves limited government"); id. at 2247 ("The separation-of-powers doc-
trine, and the history that influenced its design, therefore must inform the reach and purpose of
the Suspension Clause.").
184. See Vladeck, supra note 145, at 302-03.
185. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2275 (explaining that where it would impose "onerous
burdens on the Government .... [courts] would be required to devise sensible rules for staying
habeas corpus proceedings until the Government can comply with its requirements in a responsi-
ble way").
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IV. THE STATUS OF BAGRAM AFTER BOUMEDiENE
To date, only a handful of detainees at Bagram have petitioned for
habeas corpus in the U.S. federal courts. 186 Many more filings, how-
ever, may be expected as public attention-and volunteer lawyer re-
sources-turn from Guantanamo to other global U.S. prisons.
In this Part, we explain why Boumediene, properly understood
through the prism of its underlying limited government theory, com-
pels the conclusion that the writ applies to all prisoners being held at
the Bagram prison. We then discuss the only extant legal decision on
this issue, in which the district court concluded that the writ extended
to three non-Afghan citizens being held at the BTIF but did not ex-
tend to an Afghan citizen being held there. 187 We suggest that this
result, which the district court itself suggested was "odd" but com-
pelled by Boumediene, is a predictable result of attempts to apply Jus-
tice Kennedy's multifactor balancing test in a theoretical vacuum.
A. Why the Writ Extends to All Prisoners at Bagram
To determine whether the writ extends to prisoners at Bagram, the
federal courts must, of course, apply the factors discussed by Justice
Kennedy in Boumediene. As with any multifactor balancing test,
however, it is far easier to set forth factors to balance than it is to
determine how much weight to give to each factor. Unless the under-
lying rationale for the balancing test is understood and respected, the
result of the Court's balancing will run the risk of seeming arbitrary
and of generating apparently anomalous results.
In Boumediene, Justice Kennedy stated that "at least three factors"
were "relevant in determining the reach of the Suspension Clause,"
including "(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the ade-
quacy of the process through which that status determination was
made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then deten-
tion took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving
the prisoner's entitlement to the writ."18 8 We agree that each of these
considerations is important to assess in the habeas context. But we
186. As this Article goes to print there are only four pending Bagram habeas cases, all of
which are consolidated before Judge John D. Bates in the D.C. federal district court. See
Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 06-CV-1669 (JDB) (D.D.C.); Wazir v. Gates, No. 06-CV-1697 (JDB)
(D.D.C.); Bakri v. Obama, No. 08-CV-1307 (JDB) (D.D.C.); Al-Najar v. Gates, No. 08-CV-2143
(JDB) (D.D.C.).
187. Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 209 (D.D.C. 2009).
188. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259. These factors could, in turn, be broken down further to
include
(1) the citizenship of the detainee; (2) the status of the detainee; (3) the adequacy of the
process through which the status determination was made; (4) the nature of the site of
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
consider it essential to recognize at the outset that these factors must
be deployed in the service of determining, first and foremost, whether
Congress has been authorized by the Constitution to abrogate the fun-
damental right to judicial review of the legality of a detention. Only
after this authorization has been established should the inquiry turn to
detainees' "rights" and, finally, to whether prudential considerations
should modify the content of those rights in the particular context of
Bagram.
Our chief concern is that the Court's multifactor test will be applied
with undue weight given to considerations of detainees' "rights" or
the prudential limits on those rights, without first addressing whether
the government has the power to eliminate habeas in that context. In
other words, the risk from a misinterpretation of Boumediene is that
courts will weigh its factors without an appreciation for the impor-
tance of the limited government purpose that it serves. We expect
that application of the balancing test in a theoretical vacuum will lead
to anomalous holdings in which the applicability of the writ at Bagram
(and to other U.S. detainees around the globe) will appear random or
even unprincipled.
Accordingly, the factors in the Boumediene test that should be em-
phasized when assessing the reach of the writ to the BTIF are those
relating to the exercise of government power. More particularly, the
balancing of factors should be in the service of determining whether
the government has been authorized by the Constitution to interfere
with the court's supervisory role over detentions-and in particular
whether the de facto suspension of the writ at Bagram is reasonably
related to the exercise of the President's war powers and Congress's
power to make rules for captures. The answer to similar questions at
Guantanamo was that the political branches were not authorized by
the Constitution to eliminate the courts' role in supervising the deten-
tions at Guantanamo. The same conclusion follows inexorably in the
Bagram context for largely the same reasons.
The first factor that Justice Kennedy considered in Boumediene was
the "citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the
process through which the determination was made."'1 89  In
Boumediene, the Court determined that, notwithstanding the fact that
none of the prisoners at Guantanamo were U.S. citizens, the adequacy
of the procedures used to determine that the prisoners were enemy
apprehension; (5) the nature of the site of detention; and (6) the practical obstacles
inherent in resolving the petitioner's entitlement to the writ.
Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 215.
189. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259.
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combatants was thoroughly insufficient to support the political
branch's attempt to abrogate the judicial function by suspending the
writ. The CSRT procedures, according to the Court, "fall well short of
the procedures and adversarial mechanisms that would eliminate the
need for habeas corpus review."' 90
A comparison of the Guantanamo and Bagram procedures is in-
structive in this regard. As discussed above, 191 the UECRB process at
Bagram is even more deficient than the CSRT process at Guanta-
namo. Although the petitioners at Guantanamo were not supplied a
bill of particulars, they were provided with the "factual basis" of their
detention in advance of their CSRT; the petitioners at Bagram were
given notice of the basis of their detention only if "operational re-
quirements" permitted.192 Although the petitioners at Guantanamo
were not allowed lawyers, they were assisted by "personal representa-
tives" who might explain the functioning of the tribunal; the petition-
ers at Bagram were allowed neither lawyers nor personal
representatives. 193 Although the petitioners at Guantanamo were not
able to see or respond to the classified evidence against them, they
were allowed to appear in person before the status tribunal to plead
their case; the petitioners at Bagram were neither privy to the evi-
dence against them nor allowed to appear before the status tribunal,
and they were allowed only to submit a written statement. 194 Al-
though the petitioners at Guantanamo were denied a real opportunity
to call relevant witnesses in their defense, they were allowed to have
other detainees in the prison testify before their tribunals; the peti-
tioners at Bagram were not given this privilege. 95 Finally, although
the petitioners at Guantanamo were denied true appellate review in
the civilian courts of their "enemy combatant" designations, pursuant
to the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, they were allowed to argue to
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals that the military had failed to ad-
here to the CSRT regulations that had been promulgated by the mili-
tary;196 the Bagram petitioners are entitled to no civilian court
appellate review at all.
To the extent a district court restricts itself to comparing the status
determination procedures used at Guantanamo with those used at
190. Id. at 2260.
191. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
196. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2742 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. (2006)).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Bagram, this factor evidently points toward recognizing the writ at
Bagram. But how heavily should this factor weigh in the Boumediene
analysis? We suggest that the courts should be wary. of focusing too
much attention on these procedures, no matter how deficient they ap-
pear to be, because this mistakes an issue of limited government for
an issue of rights. In fact, the ultimate issue addressed by this factor
concerns whether the President's claimed authority-to restrict access
to the courts-is reasonably related to the exercise of his powers as
Commander in Chief. Just as significant as the inadequacies of the
UECRB procedures (or even a more robust version) is the failure of
the government to deploy them in a prompt manner by a hearing
board whose good faith application of neutral standards might be
more readily assumed. The first status hearings at Guantanamo did
not take place until fall 2004, after the Rasul decision and nearly four
years after Guantanamo had opened as a detention center. Likewise,
at Bagram, the further in time and farther in place from a detainee's
capture that a status hearing occurs, the less the courts should be will-
ing to conclude the government's claimed authority-here, to restrict
access to the courts-is reasonably related to the exercise of its war-
making powers. At a certain point, a policy of imprisonment and con-
tinued detention begins to reveal itself as a crime-control policy rather
than as an incident to the war-making function of government.
Similarly, the second of the Boumediene factors-the character of
the place of capture and of detention-is only pertinent to the degree
that these facts shed light on whether the government is acting within
the limited war-making sphere that the Constitution has authorized.
For example, when the U.S. government captures a prisoner outside
of a war zone and also detains him outside of a war zone, there is
unlikely to be a reasonable relation between the exercise of war pow-
ers and the attempt to block access to the courts. Likewise, it is rea-
sonable to conclude that the government is not acting within its
authority when it seeks to deny access to the courts to a detainee who
was taken into custody outside of a war zone and was subsequently
brought into the war zone by the government. (The four Bagram de-
tainees with pending habeas petitions fall into this category.) Conced-
edly, a stronger case that the government is acting within its
constitutional grant of authority can be made for the detainee who is
captured and detained within a war zone, at least for a reasonable
period of time after detention.
The Boumediene Court itself did not lay as much stress on the char-
acter of the place of detention as is popularly believed. To be sure,
the Court deemed it relevant that the United States maintained com-
[Vol. 59:851
2010] BOUMEDIENE AND LIMITED GOVERNMENT 891
plete jurisdiction and control over Guantanamo, notwithstanding
Cuba's ultimate sovereignty over the area. 197 And Bagram, too, is an
area over which the United States maintains tremendous control and
a similar type of "constant jurisdiction.' ' 198 Under both the Guanta-
namo and Bagram leases, for example, the United States has the right
to exclusive use of the land;199 to perpetual possession at its discre-
tion;200 to occupation with de minimis or no rental obligation;201 to
freedom from host country efforts to exert control over the prem-
ises;202 and to the assignment of property to another party without the
consent of the host nation.20 3 As at Guantanamo, in short, as a practi-
cal matter, the United States maintains complete control over
Bagram.
That said, a simple comparison between Bagram and Guantanamo
threatens to obscure why the degree of U.S. government control over
the area is an important question. The point of the exercise is not to
determine in a theoretical vacuum whether Guantanamo, Bagram, or
another territory is in the effective control of the United States. Do-
ing so would give undue primacy to the territorialist considerations
that were relegated to a relatively minor role in the Boumediene anal-
ysis. Rather, it is to determine whether the U.S. government is acting
in an area over which it is authorized by the Constitution to suspend
access to the courts. The answer to this question hinges on the nature
and rationales for the exercise of government power: What specifically
is the military mission at Bagram, and what is the connection between
this mission and the suspension of habeas? Does holding detainees
for more than seven years at Bagram, with the limited process they
have been thus far allowed, relate to the fulfillment of this mission?
To be clear, we argue that the geographic location of the place of
detention is a pertinent factor in determining whether the writ extends
197. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2261.
198. Id.
199. See Guantanamo Lease, supra note 31, art. III; Bagram Lease, supra note 29, 1$ 1, 9.
200. See Relations with Cuba, U.S.-Cuba, art. III, May 29, 1934, T.S. No. 866; Bagram Lease,
supra note 29, 4.
201. See Guantanamo Lease, supra note 31, art. I, 28; Bagram Lease, supra note 29, 5.
202. See Bagram Lease, supra note 29, 9.
203. See id. 2. In addition, pursuant to a binding exchange of diplomatic notes, Afghanistan
has ceded fundamental elements of its sovereignty, including the right to exercise criminal juris-
diction over U.S. personnel and its detainees; to lay civil claims against the United States for
damages within Afghanistan; to regulate the entry and exit of persons in Afghanistan; to charge
fees and tolls for the use of Afghan roads and airspace; to inspect vehicles within Afghan terri-
tory; to impose taxes; to regulate imports and exports into Afghanistan; to regulate commercial
development in Afghanistan; and to the exclusive development, operation and control of tele-
communications systems. See Diplomatic Note No. 202, supra note 33.
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extraterritorially to prisoners who seek court review of the legality of
the detention, but geography alone can never be determinative of the
reach of the writ. Geography is only relevant to the extent that it
supports or undermines the government's position that it is authorized
by its war powers to restrict prisoner access to the federal courts.
Even in contexts where the government's arguments are the strongest
(for example, in hot combat zones), time must always be factored as a
variable into the constitutional equation. A court might conclude, for
example, that the federal habeas courts are not open to an enemy
combatant who was seized and detained in a combat zone in Kanda-
har, Afghanistan; that same court cannot, however, declare that the
writ somehow "does not extend" to Kandahar. Such a conclusion
would be permissible only if the Supreme Court had adopted a territo-
rialist understanding of the reach of the Constitution which, as we
have shown above, it has not. Instead, as the length of detention in-
creases, the link between the government's war powers and its at-
tempts to block access to the courts will likely grow increasingly
tenuous. To this extent, the limited government conception of the
reach of the constitution envisions a "global" writ, in the sense that
there is nowhere on earth where the government's power to block
access to the courts is perpetual.
Finally, Boumediene instructs us to assess the practical obstacles
that stand in the way of allowing detainees access to the courts, so that
we can determine whether it would be "impracticable and anomalous"
to allow habeas petitions to emanate from an extraterritorial locale. 20 4
Again, a comparison between Bagram and Guantanamo is useful, but
it cannot alone be determinative. Obviously, in some ways Bagram is
like Guantanamo and in some ways it is different. In assessing the
importance of these similarities and differences, we must bear in mind
that the goal is to assess whether there is a reasonable relation be-
tween the government's power to wage war and its efforts to suspend
the role of the courts in overseeing detentions. The government has
argued, in both the Bagram and Guantanamo contexts, that it would
disrupt the war effort to allow detainees to sue for their release in
federal court.20 5 Most importantly, according to the government, it
204. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan,
J., concurring)).
205. The government argued that the Supreme Court had previously
recognized that extension of the writ to alien enemies held abroad would "hamper the
war effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy." Indeed, "[i]t would be difficult to
devise a more effective fettering of a field commander than to allow the very enemies
he is ordered to reduce to submission to call him to account in his own civil courts and
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would divert resources and personnel from the battlefield to the
courtroom.
Justice Kennedy acknowledged in Boumediene "that there are costs
to holding the Suspension Clause applicable in a case of military de-
tention abroad" because habeas proceedings "may require expendi-
ture of funds by the Government and may divert the attention of
military personnel from other pressing tasks. ' 20 6 Nonetheless, he ulti-
mately found such arguments to be unpersuasive because
"[c]ompliance with any judicial process requires some incremental ex-
penditure of resources," and notwithstanding this fact, "civilian courts
and the Armed Forces have functioned along side each other at vari-
ous points in our history. ' 207 Stated differently, the government could
not show a reasonable relation at Guantanamo between its war efforts
and its decision to suspend detainee access to the courts.
A similar argument holds true for Bagram. While Bagram is lo-
cated in a war zone, the degree of U.S. control over the area makes it
implausible that the war effort would be significantly impacted by al-
lowing detainees to file habeas corpus petitions in federal court. Par-
ticularly in an age when videoconferencing in the courts is common,
the practical difficulties would appear more theoretical than actual.
Indeed, the fact that some (undisclosed) number of detainees at
Bagram were actually captured outside of Afghanistan and brought to
the war zone suggests that government arguments about the impracti-
cality of allowing access to the courts are hyperbolic. Moreover, the
transfer of prisoners into a war zone further undermines any sugges-
tion that there is a reasonable relation between the war effort and the
need to suspend access to the courts for Bagram detainees.
In sum, we contend that the Boumediene factors cannot be assessed
in a mechanistic fashion, but instead must be seen through the prism
of a coherent theory of the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution.
As detentions lengthen, procedural protections are abandoned, the lo-
cation of the prison becomes more secure, and access to the courts is
divert his efforts and attention from the military offensive abroad to the legal defensive
at home."
Brief for the Respondents at 19-20, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (Nos. 06-1195 &
06-1196) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 (1950));
see also Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 21, Maqaleh v. Gates, Nos. 09-5265, 09-5266, 09-
5277 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 14, 2009), available at http://www.scotusblog.comlwp-contentluploads/2009/
09JUS-Bagram-brief-9-14-09.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2010) ("The logistical complications cre-
ated by civil litigation would divert military officials from their proper focus on the mission of
winning the ongoing war.").
206. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2261.
207. Id.
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made more practicable, it becomes increasingly impossible to contend
that the government's refusal to allow access to the courts is reasona-
bly related to its constitutional authority to wage war.
B. The Difficulty of Applying the Boumediene
Factors Without a Theory
In Maqaleh v. Gates, a federal district judge employed the
Boumediene balancing test in order to determine whether four
Bagram detainees could petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 20 8 One
petitioner was an Afghan citizen who was captured in the United
Arab Emirates; the second was a Tunisian who was captured in Paki-
stan; the third was a Yemeni who was captured in Thailand; and the
fourth was a Yemeni who was captured (he alleged) somewhere "be-
yond Afghan borders. '20 9 All were rendered to Bagram, and all had
been held in detention-without charge or trial and without access to
a lawyer-for six years or more. 210
On a motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of jurisdiction, the
court concluded that habeas corpus review was available for three of
the four petitioners. Recognizing that "it may seem odd that different
conclusions can be reached for different detainees at Bagram," the
court stated that this was "the predictable outcome of the functional,
multi-factor, detainee-by-detainee test" that the Supreme Court man-
dated in the Boumediene case.211 We agree that the court's conclusion
seems odd, but we disagree that it was a necessary consequence of
Boumediene's balancing test. Indeed, we believe the district court's
decision demonstrates the dangers of applying Justice Kennedy's mul-
tifactor test without an underlying theory of why the factors bear on
the question of whether habeas review should be available at Bagram.
With respect to the court's analysis of any single Boumediene factor,
there is relatively little to quibble about in the Maqaleh decision. The
district court recognized that the Bagram petitioners "are virtually
identical to the detainees in Boumediene.'2 12 They are all non-U.S.
citizens who were captured overseas and "brought to ... another
country for detention. ' 213 They have all been determined to be "en-
emy combatants," and they all contest that determination. The Guan-
tanamo prisoners were afforded inadequate process to contest their
208. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 209 (D.D.C. 2009).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 208.
213. Id.
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status, and at Bagram the process was "significantly less than the
Guantanamo detainees . . . received. '2 14 The "objective degree of
control" of the United States at the BTIF, too, "is not appreciably
different than that at Guantanamo. '' 215 Indeed, only the "practical
obstacles" to habeas review seem appreciably different in nature, and
it may reasonably be seen to be "in some ways greater than those
present for a Guantanamo detainee, because Bagram is located in an
active theater of war."216
The difficulty with the district court's analysis concerns how these
factors are actually "balanced." Understandably, the court seems at a
loss to divine the motivating principle behind the Boumediene test.
How much importance should the reviewing court place on the "prac-
tical obstacles" to litigating habeas cases at Bagram? Which practical
obstacles are the most relevant, and why?
Happily for three of the four petitioners, the court concluded that
the practical obstacles to allowing detainees to seek judicial review of
the legality of their detentions were de minimis. The court held, for
example, that videoconferencing obviated the need to transfer prison-
ers to hearings,217 and that the government's claim of extraordinary
burden was unpersuasive because some expense, time, and personnel
has always attended court cases in which the military is a party. More-
over, as the court emphasized, any practical obstacles to judicial re-
view for detainees who had been captured outside of Afghanistan and
then brought into the war zone were self-evidently difficulties of the
military's own making.218
Thus far, nothing in the district court's decision or in its application
of the Boumediene test is in tension with our underlying limited gov-
ernment theory of the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution. But
for the fourth petitioner, the district court gave determinative weight
to the fact that he was an Afghan citizen, explaining that "the possibil-
ity of friction with the host country cannot be discounted and consti-
tutes a significant obstacle to habeas review." 219 The potential for
friction, according to the court, arose because Afghans held in U.S.
custody are "subject to transfer to Afghan custody" pursuant to a dip-
214. Id. at 209; see also id. at 226-27 (discussing the sufficiency of process).
215. Id. at 209; see also id. at 221-26 (discussing the site of detention).
216. Id. at 208; see also id. at 227-31 (discussing the practical obstacles).
217. See id. at 228.
218. See id. at 230-31.
219. Id. at 231. The district court noted earlier in the opinion that the Supreme Court had
provided "little guidance as to what the citizenship factor means after Boumediene" and that
"the most this Court can say with any certainty is that U.S. citizenship helps petitioners whereas
foreign citizenship does not." Id. at 218-19.
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lomatic arrangement. If such a transfer were to occur, and if the peti-
tioner were to seek his release in an Afghan court, the local court
might end up "applying an entirely different process and legal stan-
dards. ' 220 In addition, if an Afghan prisoner were ordered released,
"the prime destination for such release would be Afghanistan," and
such "unilateral releases of Bagram detainees by the United States
could easily upset the delicate diplomatic balance the United States
has struck with the host government. '221
As an initial matter, it is unclear why the district court put so much
weight on these hypothetical concerns. The Afghan petitioner had
not been transferred to the control of Afghanistan, and there was no
showing that such a transfer was imminent. The Maqaleh court
seemed to be analogizing from the abstention doctrine (by which the
federal courts in some circumstances decline the exercise of their ju-
risdiction in deference to the state courts),222 but the decision offers
no explanation of why deference to Afghan courts would be appropri-
ate. In addition, the district court's concern about the exercise of con-
current jurisdiction is itself premised on the assumption that the
district court would retain habeas jurisdiction if the Afghan petitioner
were transferred out of U.S. and into Afghan custody. The govern-
ment, at least, has argued in parallel detainee litigation that federal
court jurisdiction would cease upon such a transfer, and at least one
district court judge has agreed.223 Similarly, the court's concern about
causing friction if it were to order the military to release an Afghan
citizen into Afghanistan is premised on the assumption that the court
would possess the power to make such an order and that release is the
only remedy available for a habeas petitioner who establishes that his
detention is illegal. This is not the law of the D.C. Circuit at
present.224
220. Id. at 229.
221. Id. at 230.
222. See, e.g., Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976);
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25
(1959); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. 496 (1941).
223. See Abdah v. Bush, No. 04-1254, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4942, at *13 (D.D.C. Mar. 29,
2005) (noting the government's argument that, upon transfer of Guantanamo prisoners to an-
other country, the district court will no longer have jurisdiction to provide habeas relief); id. at
*17 ("Petitioners' transfer to another nation would assuredly deprive the court of its jurisdic-
tion."). While we believe that Judge Bates is correct that the court's habeas jurisdiction would
survive the transfer of a habeas petitioner to another country (and that the contrary conclusion
in Abdah is unnecessary dicta), such a position is by no means self-evident.
224. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (vacating a district court order to
release seventeen petitioners into the United States), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009), cert.
vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010). We believe that the district court has the power to order the
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Most troubling about the district court's conclusion that habeas is
not available for an Afghan petitioner detained in Afghanistan is that
there is no explanation of why the practical obstacles identified by the
court-whether likely to materialize or not-should weigh so heavily
in the balance of whether the government may restrict a detainee's
access to the courts. In our opinion, there might be a stronger argu-
ment for the government's attempt to strip habeas jurisdiction from
the courts when a prisoner is captured in a war zone and detained
there, at least so long as the detention is for a discrete period of time
and the security of the detention site remains unsure. In such circum-
stances-which are not present at the detention facility at Bagram-
the government might more readily contend that its efforts to limit
detainees' access to the courts are reasonably related to the war ef-
fort. 225 The Maqaleh decision, however, provides no compelling ex-
planation for its disparate assessment of the reach of the writ for
detainees of different nationalities at Bagram.
V. CONCLUSION
The Maqaleh decision demonstrates the risks of not fully appreciat-
ing the limited government approach at the heart of Boumediene. For
too long the debate about the extension of habeas to Guantanamo
focused almost exclusively on the status of the detainees (as non-citi-
zens without any prior connection to U.S. society) and the status of
the base (as sovereign Cuban territory with complete U.S. jurisdiction
and control). The preoccupation with these membership approaches
to extraterritoriality obscured the importance of limited government
in the extraterritoriality doctrine. Boumediene returned limited gov-
ernment to prominence by emphasizing the separation of powers and
the connection between habeas restrictions and the government's
power to wage war.
Yet commentators and courts have so far viewed Boumediene as a
purely pragmatic decision. This focus on pragmatism qua pragmatism
risks increased instability in an already difficult extraterritoriality doc-
trine, widely divergent results in similar cases, and insufficient regard
for core constitutional values. As applied to Bagram and other similar
facilities, pure pragmatism risks enabling the government to operate a
vast, permanent global prison system beyond court scrutiny.
release of the detainees, and that at a minimum it could adjudicate the habeas petition on the
merits and devise an alternative remedy to release.
225. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008) (noting, in a discussion of
practical obstacles that might impact the military mission, that the argument might "have more
weight" if Guantanamo "were located in an active theater of war").
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Focusing instead on limited government directs the court to the na-
ture and purpose of the government's war powers. These powers can
and will include the ability to delay habeas for recently captured pris-
oners in a battlefield setting. Yet although it is vast, even this power
has its limits. As time, distance, and geography vary, the scope of
power varies as well. Functionalism and pragmatism will play impor-
tant roles in determining how to measure this scope.
But one principle lies beyond pragmatism: indefinite detention
without any court review is fundamentally inconsistent with any exer-
cise of government power under the U.S. Constitution. This is the
promise of Boumediene-and of limited government.
